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Ill INTRODUCTION 
Article 7 of  the Protocol on social policy to the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union states that "The 
Commission  shall draw up  a report each year on  progress  in  achieving the  objective  of Article  1, 
including the  demographic situation  in  the  Community.".  (Article  1  ,  for  its  part,  provides that  "The 
Community  and the  Member  states  shall have  as  their objectives  the  promotion of employment, 
improved living and working conditions,  proper social protection,  dialogue between management and 
labour, the development of  human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating 
of exclusion.") 
It is the Commission's intention to publish a report covering the aforementioned  objectives in Article  1 
after the end of 1994. However, because the report on demography is the first of its type for the Union 
and  because it is  especially  highlighted  in  Article  7  of the  Protocol,  the  Commission  considers  it 
appropriate to publish this report separately at this juncture. 
This report has been prepared on the basis of material and of technical assistance supplied by Eurostat, 
with the assistance of private experts iri the field  of demography. 
Contemporary European demography immediately raises four main questions, each of which is dealt 
with in a separate chapter. 
The main trends in European demography in the world and the issues that they raise are examined in 
Chapter 1.  Is there a "European" demographic model?  Are the Twelve faced by the same demographic 
processes and therefore the same social and economic challenges? In the case of economic challenges 
in particular, what changes have taken place in the active population?  Is the population of the Union 
moving towards demographic behaviour and an age structure which is specific to this population?  Do 
the forecasts point to new developments? 
The ageing of the population is nowadays a major and central trend in demographic evolution.  During 
the  next century,  this  ageing  is  likely to  cause  the  world  population  to  move  towards  a stationary 
situation.  Ageing is affecting many aspects of our economic and social organisation.  Chapter 2 studies 
the development of age structures in the European Union and opens up discussion of its consequences 
from the point of  view, among others, of the situation of  the elderly, labour organisation and the financing 
of retirement. 
This population ageing is being paralleled by growing differences in household and family life. Analysis 
of this  trend,  in Chapter 3,  is  important  for two  reasons.  First,  because the  family  is  the  place  of 
demographic reproduction and is therefore closely involved in the construction of  demographic models. 
Second,  because the  family  is the  pivot between  the  individual  and  society  with  the  result that  its 
analysis makes it possible to  observe trends in the socio-economic system as a whole. 
Chapter 4 looks at migration. The mechanism of declining natural growth, i.e. the surplus of births over 
deaths, is amplifying the extent of the increase due to migration.  Bearing this in mind, does migration 
help to modify demographic evolution and in  particular the ageing process? 
• 
These are all vast questions and have complex interrelations.  It is therefore very important to give the 
analysis a global dimension, as demographic evolution is part and parcel of a wider set of far-reaching 
changes, in particular a technological and economic revolution, a family and social revolution and finally 
a political and cultural revolution. 
It is for this reason, in this first report, that we will shall endeavour principally to describe demographic 
events in a broad perspective rather than attempting a detailed analysis of the actual causes of certain 
aspects. The approach is broad in time, as demographic events take place over a longer time-space than other 
events.  Today's demographic situation is to a large extent the result of demographic behaviour in the 
past, just as today's demographic behaviour will structure the population of the next century. 
It is also broad in space, since world demographic balances are constantly changing in the same way 
as economic balances. 
It is also broad as regards its investigations, as the issues affecting  human life are very complex: the 
economy,  politics,  ways  of thinking  and  social  structure  are  all  factors  involved  in  demographic 
behaviour. 
This initial report analyses what we currently know about demographic development.  This may seem 
reductive.  The aim of this work is surely to provide a vision of the future?  This is true, but the choice 
of strategy can be explained.  In the first instance, it was vital to identify the major, societal trends linked 
to  demographic development.  We  needed to  understand  the  mechanisms  that are generating this 
development in  order to  be  able to  pinpoint inevitable changes in the short term and separate those 
factors that can be influenced from those that it is difficult to control.  The major trends that our analysis 
has highlighted are summarised in boxes at the end of each chapter.  This is the  only way of building 
up relevant scenarios of future  development that  can  be  used to  provide a serious and  constructive 
forward-looking perspective that avoids short-term suppositions.  This forward-looking perspective will 
be the guiding thread of subsequent reports. 
2 CHAPTER I 
THE  DEMOGRAPHIC  MODEL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION 
If a description of the main demographic parameters of the European Union is to be of use it must 
shed some light on wider questions relating to  these parameters. It is precisely for this reason that 
the conuquences of the ageing of the population and the issues raised by family changes and by 
migration are  analysed  in this report.  A more general question nelda io be raised  in the first 
instance if this analysis Is to be meaningful: will the various common policies entailed in European 
union lead to a convergenc. of demographic behaviour or will this behaviour be Independent of thla 
union  7 Thla  Initial chapter examines the question In  detail  and  attempts to find out about the 
demographic modelspecifec to the European Union, to  understand, as far aa this is possible, on what 
esaentlal principles It Is based and to estimate, from this, the demographic future of the Union. 
All  the demographic indicators of the European  Union can,  when analysed  in the long term,  be 
classified in terms of their ability to discriminate at geographical level, I.e. their ability to show a 
difference or a similarity, on the one hand between the Union and other regions of the world and, 
on the other hand between Union Member States. Five series can be identified: 
(1) At world level, natural growth (surplus of binhs over deaths) and the ageing of age structures 
differentiate developed countries from developing countries; 
(2) In cornpMison with other developed countries, the European Union forms a block with the other 
countries of the European continent as regards population density and growth rates.  Population 
density is half that of Japan but much higher than that of the USA or Australia; demographic growth 
is more vigorous than in Japan but less than in Nonh America; 
(3) On the EuropeM continent, three indices clearly separate the European Union and EFT  A countries 
from other States: the migration model, the simultaneous nature of  changes in behaviour as regards 
fenility and other family parameters and mortality levels; 
(4) Within thtl Europet~n Union itself,  some demographic variables closely linked to the status of 
women show a North~South axis.  short·t~rm fenility levels,  ~amity models and women's work; 
(5) No grouping is possible for some variables that require observation at the •t  the level of  Member 
Stt~tes.  This is true of the ageing effect and in particular the structure of the active population 
whose differences are sustained by social and employment policies specific to each Member State. 
The  composition of migration stocks,  where history plays a major role,  is  also specific to each 
Member State. 
1.1  The  European Union in the world 
- 1 •  The Union's demographic ranking: third In  the world, first in the developed world 
With its 348.5 million  inhabitants  on  1 January  1994, the  European  Union  is the  third  world 
demographic power after China (\  .188 billion) and India (870 million).  It is in front of  the CfS (290 
million) and the United Stites (255 million).  Indonesia (180 minion), Brazil (156 minion), Japan, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh  (  120 million each)  and lastly Nigeria (around 116 million) come funher 
down the ranking. 
The .Union retains its third place, among the groups mentioned above, In the United Nations' mean 
projection for 2025. 
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These figures show the extent to which the world demographic situa_tion has changed over the last 
forty years.  Over this short period of time the world population has doubled, increasing from 2.5 
billion to 5.5 billion inhabitants.  There is.  however, a major difference between the developing 
countries and the developed countries.  It would not be exaggerated to talk about a demographic · 
explosion among the former where growth has been. from 1.  7 to 4.2 biliion.  Growth in the latter 
group has been much more moderate: from 832 million to 1.2 billion.  In percentage terms, a growth. 
of  147% -as  against  44%. Is it surprising that the  population o( the  developed  world,  which 
accounted for one third of the world population at the end of the war, now aecounts for no more 
than one fifth  1  Its decline would have been even more precipitate if it had not been offset by the 
positive effects of the b~by  boom, falling mortality rates and immigration. 
4 The world population: changing groups 
A compan·son of trends in  developing countries and in developed countries over the period 1960 to 2025 
assumes that these two groups !MN retain the same composition.  Nothing is less certain.  IMiat would the 
term "developing• otherwise mean?  Among the countries of the third world in 1960 some, such as South 
Korea and the other Asian  'tigers~ are now developed.  others are very likely to be developed by 2025. 
Brazil and the whole of South America, Turkey and pan of  the Middle East.  Thailand,  Malaysia, Indonesia 
and possibly China and Vietnam !Mil have joined the group of developed countries by 2025.  This forecast 
is bome out whatever the development criterion used: per capita income, human development index of  the 
United Nations Development Programme or fertility levels.  It is to be feared,  however, that some countries 
which are developed at present will [eave the leading group if  the political and economic problems that they 
currently face continue.  The observation, based on United Nations' forecasts, that the developed countries 
will account for a further reduced proportion of the world population in 2025 is not relevant as it does not 
take account of  the entry of  new countries into this group. 
This  situation  a/so applies to  the  future  of the  European  Union:  forecasts  should take  account of both 
demographic changes and political changes.  Since this reporl has been drawn up,  three additional States 
have voted to adhere to European Union. By early in the next Century, other EFT  A countries and a number 
of Eastern and Central European countries may have also joined the Union.  There is little doubt that the 
area stretching from  the Atlantic to  the  Urals  formed in  this  way would not only retain  its  current world 
demographic ranking fifty years hence,  but could even increase it.  There  is also little  doubt that these 
changes would have a major impact on the conclusions that can now be drawn from the current European 
Union's "demographic model". 
- 2 - Natural growth: almost zero in the developed world, still high elsewhere 
The  UN  has  estimated  world  population  growth  in  1993  at  1.6%,  which  would,  if this  rate  were 
maintain  ...  ed, double the planet's population in 42 years, i.e. between now and 2035.  This growth is not, 
however, equally distributed over the planet: it is almost zero in the most developed countries (0.4%) 
and still substantial in those countries which are least developed (2.3% if China, which has restrained 
its growth to  1.2%, is excluded). 
The Third World Conference on population and development which took place in Cairo last September 
examined demographic problems linked to development.  There now seems to be a consensus about 
the need for slower natural growth in the developing countries.  Since a fall in  fertility  rates has to do 
with  personal decisions, couples' free choice to decide on the number and timing of their children has 
been  put  forward  as a basic principle.  The  action  programme  adopted  at the  conference therefore 
focused on ways of promoting this free choice, essential among which were: enhancing the status of 
women, equality between men and women in society, support for the family  and all that this entails in 
the  area of information,  education and  health services. 
While it may be true that world growth has slowed down in recent years, two large areas of Africa have 
not yet joined  this  trend.  In  sub-Saharan  Africa,  women  still  have  an  average  of 6.7  children  and 
demographic growth in this area exceeds 3% which is close to the growth rate of North Africa and the 
Middle East,  the second area with high fertility  levels. 
- 3 - The ageing of age structures: soon to affect the world as a whole 
Differences in fertility  and mortality  levels between developed and developing countries have led to  a 
twofold  age  structure.  In  the  developing countries,  40%  of the  population  is aged  under 15.  This 
proportion is close to 50% in those African  countries where fertility  levels are high, whereas it is only 
20% in the developed countries.  The latter, however, have proportions of elderly people (aged over 65) 
of some 12% to  15%, whereas these proportions are  4%  or less in the developing countries. 
5 Despite this, the demographic indicators show that a number of countries are now in the midst of a stage 
of demographic transition where declining fertility is running parallel with the earlier drop in mortality. 
Demographic ageing has therefore become - and will increasingly become - a worldwide phenomenon 
likely to affect all countries of the planet as they progress through their demographic transition. 
In overall terms, the classical divide -the wealthy and old developed countries and the poor and young 
developing countries - will become increasingly irrelevant, not only from the economic point of view, but 
also from the demographic point of view.  What will remain true,  however, is that major differences in 
ageing levels between these two groups of countries will continue for a long time,  even if there is a 
certain amount of catching up because the demographic transition proves to be more rapid in the South 
than it was in the North. 
This highlights the main problem -the developing countries will have to deal with the challenge of ageing 
when they are having to tackle a number of  other problems- integrating young people, modernising their 
economy, paying off their debts, improving their health and education systems and safeguarding their 
environment.  Even though they still have fairly  low ageing indices,  many  countries in the Southern 
hemisphere are already having to support growing elderly populations in large towns and cities and in 
some cases in  rural areas which have been abandoned by young people.  Elderly people are already 
more numerous, in absolute terms, in the countries of the South than in the countries of the North and 
this trend seems likely to continue to worsen over the  next twenty to  thirty years. 
According to  United Nations' forecasts for 2025, the developed countries, including Europe and North 
America, will have no more than a quarter or so of all the world's "elderly" (60 and over) - less than in 
Southern Asia alone.  On this same date, China and India will probably have more octogenarians (80 
and  over: 36  million) than Europe,  plus the former USSR,  the United States  and Japan, but with the 
additional difference that in  the seventy-five years since 1950 the number of elderly people will have 
increased fivefold in these two giants, whereas they will only have doubled in Europe
1
. 
The burden of ageing will therefore be more difficult to support in those areas of the world with the most 
urgent development needs.  Ways of tackling the demographic explosion, which will continue long after 
fertility  has started to  decline, need to be found.  This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that 
administrative,  health and social welfare structures for elderly people are not well developed. 
1.2  The European Union among developed countries 
- 1 - Geographical distribution of the population 
With Asia, the European Union is one of the planet's most densely populated areas: 140 inhabitants per 
knf in the European Union as against 40 in the world and 11 0 in Europe as a whole - the decrease in 
the  European average being explained by the low population density of Scandinavia. 
In  the  other developed countries - with the  exception of Japan which has 330 inhabitants per knf -
densities are very low.  North America and the CIS,  for instance, have only 13 inhabitants per knf and 
Australia has only 3 inhabitants per knf. 
6 
Source : D.  Tabutin, '"L'age vermeil du Tiers Monde: perspectives des populationsagees dans les pays jeunes'" (The 
silver age of the  third  world: prospects for elderly populations in  young countries), in  M.  Loriaux, D.  Remy  and E. 
Vilquin, (1990), Populations~gl!es  et rl!votution grise. pp. 1087-1103. Provided that these United Nations projections are not invalidated by wars or epidemics, the situation 
of these two extremes should not be any different in 2025.  The European high density pole, however, 
will  extend  to  the  Middle  East  and  that  of Asia  will increase  in  size.  Two  secondary  areas  of 
demographic concentration are also likely to appear on the Guinea coast and in Eastern Africa. 
At national level, the map of  densities shows a concentric distribution in the European Union as a whole. 
The population eplcentre Is in Benelux with over 300 inhabitants"per kmZ.  Close to this, densities are 
200 Inhabitants or over in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, but  start to decrease further away. 
Densities are belOw  100 inhabitants  beyond the  Pyrenees, in Scandinavia, over the Russian·Polish 
border and in the South of the Balkans. 
When a more detailed breakdown is made for the main regions of the Union, population densities are 
not so uniform.  There is some consistency, however, since adjacent regions have the same features. 
From Manchester to Milan there is a large very highly populated crescent.  Around this backbone, ribs 
of population extend over the Italian, French and ·even Spanish coasts and towards Central Europe. 
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• 2 •  Moderate demographic growth 
In comparison with growth in the USA which is much higher and growth in Japan which is lower, the 
total growth of the Union population can be seen as moderate and also as more stable.  This is due to 
two factors.  Japan's population structure is older than that of the Union.  As  fertility  (1.5 children per 
woman) and migration balances are low in ~apan, growth is in decHne, and may -ven be negative at 
tile beginning of the next miUennium.  In contrast, the United States still has a fertility level close to the 
~eneration renewal threshold (2 children per woman)  and positive migration flows. 
7 Moderate demographic growth and a high density are consequently the two main features of Europe. 
They separate Europe from the other developed countries • CIS, United States, Japan • although 
there does not seems to be a clear-cut divide between the Union Member States and the other 
Europe1n countries.  This divide does, however, exist.  In order to find it, more detailed indic1tors 
pinpointing the dynamic that has given the Union ita specific nature need  to be examined.  The 
trends which shape this or that demographic system and provide it with its originality consequently 
need to be investigated.  There is little doubt that Western Europe has its own demographic system. 
1.3  Similarities between Member States 
If, after comparing the European continent with the rest of the world, the field of investigation is 
limited to Europe alone, it can be sun thlt the European Union differs from the remainder of the 
continent because of converging processes which to some extent determine its population flows: 
(1) migration models, (2) some family practices, t3) mortality. 
• 1 •  The mfgratlon model: emigration at an end, and a reserve of foreign population 
At  the beginning of the 1 960s, migration varied greatly among Union countries. Greece, Spain, Italy 
and  Portugal  provided large numbers  of immigrants.  Migration  flows to France,  Belgium  and 
Germany were substantial: people returning from colonial empires in France and Belgium and foreign 
workers in Germany. The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg also took in significant 
numbers of immigrants.  This trend was not reflected by other countries, such as the Scandinavian 
countries where there had been  intense emigration to the United States at the beginning of the 
century. 
Table2 
Nowadays,  the  number  of  foreigners  is 
increasing  more  rapidly  in  Italy,  Greece  and 
Spain,  where  immigration  is  a  recent 
development.  It  is  levelling  off  in  France, 
Belgium,  the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and  luxembourg  where  immigration  is  older. 
Despite  this  timelag,  all  the  Union  Member 
States are tending towards the same model: low 
emigration, controlled immigration #(om non-EU 
countries and a trend towards settling in of the 
foreign population.  There is nothing mysterious 
about these similarities: international migration 
is  sensitive  to  economic  factors.  In  a 
democratic system, an economic community is 
gradually  reflected  by similar  migration  flows 
resulting  from  converging  standards of living, 
migration  thus  becoming  an  act  of reasoned 
decision and free  personal choice.  The  recent 
history  of  the  Eastern  block  shows  similar 
migration  patterns.  While  the  block  was 
isolated, migration was almost zero.  Once the 
barriers  were  down,  migration  was  more 
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• 2 - Simultaneous nature of some pract_ices c~nne_cted_.w~th the family life cycle 
The similarity of family practices is a much more curious ·e)(ample since it cannot be explained by 
a common European policy on the family as no such policy exists.  This similarity does, however, 
exist.  Western Europe, in panicular the Union, obviously differs from Eastern Europe in this area. 
This is borne out by two figures: the mean  age of women at first marriage and the mean  age of 
women at the binh of their first child. 
8 
• Map 2: Mean age of women at birth of first c~ild around  1993 
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Map 3: Mean age of women at first marriage around 1993 
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Source: Council of Europe, Recent demographic developments in Europe - 1994 
9 For both of these variables, a precise line divides Europe into two: in the West the mean age of 
women at first marriage is over 24 and in the East it is still below 22  .5. 
The difference in age at marriage between the West and the East may well be explained by the two 
opposing systems which were in force until recently.  In the East, it was necessary to be married 
to have a flat allocated by the State.  In the West, it was • and still is • necessary to be unled to 
marry.  In other words, people in the West have to have adequate savings or income which entails 
a relatively long waiting period. 
Over and above age at marriage, this historical difference between the East and Weat • maintained 
by economies of opposite types • highlights an  even more fundamental diffe;ence in family life 
cycles and in individual relationships within families and with society.  Methods of controlling and 
trends in procreative behaviour provide a further illustration. 
There  ~re few reliable data on induced abortion.  The few official data that are available, those on 
abortion carried out under medical superviaion, are underestimated to varying extenu. Despite thit, 
these data show that abortion Is practised in the East to an extent that is three, four and even five 
times higher than in the West.  In the European Union, percentages around 1990 were below 3&. 
abortions per 1  00 births, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had rates of 60 to. 150 
abortions per 1  00 births.  Whatever the reason for this, one thing is clear: women in the Europe., 
Union, because they use modern contraceptive methods, have more control over their fertility than 
women in the countries of the East and Centre of Europe, providing them with greater autonornv 
in their choice of family model.  This factor has undoubtedly helped to differentiate the Western 
family from the Eastern family. 
Before modern contraceptive methods were available, this difference was already perceptible in the 
extraordinarily simultaneous way in which fertility trends were reversed in all the Western countries. 
To appreciate this, we need to focus on fertility trends rather than fertility levels which vary from 
country to country. 
If the dates corresponding to the reversal  of the fertility trend in the countries of the European 
continent are ploned on a time line extending from 1900 to the present, Western EurQpe forma a 
very compact group from the 1920s onwards, while Central and Eastern Europe is very erratic.  In 
all the countries of the West, from Finland to Spain, from l~eland to Italy and from Ireland to Austria, 
fertility fell between 1920 and the mid·; 930s.  It then rose again from a date between ·1934 and 
1939.  There was a pause during the war followed by a further increase immediately after the war. 
It soared in the 1950s but the trend was reversed between 1961 and 1964, marking the beginning 
of a long decline.  The same fluctuations took place in Nonh America and Australia, but five year.s 
earlier.  Japan, where fertility has simply fallen from over four children to less than two in the few 
years following the war, has not followed this panern.  Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, 
a new trend seems to be generating a North-South divide within Western Europe itself. 
It  seems likely, therefore, that different societies started to evolve together after the first world war. 
While  they undoubtedly retained  the differences  of level shaped by their past,  they were now 
subject to the same determining factors.  At this stage, parallelism would be a more appropria• 
term than convergence. 
The substantial increase in the age at which women have their first child highlights an important 
development. The period of life separating childhood, and even youth, from the age of parenthood 
has been extended with the result that people live for longer with their parents, in consensual 
unions,  or continue  their education  for longer periods  in the  hope of obtaining a  better  jo~. 
Unemployment has also had an  impact.  In many Member States,  50% of young people now 
become senled only after the age of 25. It  is only at this age that they have a job, a residence away 
from the parental home and a relationship with a stable partner. What some people have called a 
•new age of lite• then takes the.form more of  a time of experimentation than a waiting period, 
profoundly changing morals and in particular relationships between sexes and the generations. This 
is likely to produce young Europeans having a profile which differs from that of young Americans, 
young Eastern Europeans and young Japanese. 
10 The fenility index is verv sensitive to calendar variations, i.e. earlier or later marriage and conception 
- events  which provide family formation with its rhythm.  It is for this reason  that it does not 
measure the dimension of the family once it has been fully formed.  All this makes the concomitant 
trends in the countries of Western Europe even more surprising.  It means that, despite relatively 
differtnt family structural, these countritl have reacted in the same way to historic events.  People 
have curbed or accelerated family formation at the same time.  Made prudent by the 1929 crisis, 
for Instance, they postPQned conception, but returned to their normal practices five or six years 
later. In other words, rather than pointing to a convergence of  structures, this seems to show that 
influences and reactions are identical. 
Analysis of the European Union therefore shows a community of reactions as regards contraceptive 
methods, age  at marriage and fertility rate1,  differentiating Member States from other European 
countries and from_ the rest of the wortd. 
• 3 •  Trenda In mortality 
Trends in life expectancy and in infant mortality in Europe since 1946 are both constructed around 
the same scenario.  After the war, infant monality fell to fifty per thousand throughout Northern 
Europe.  It was slightly higher in Fntnce, Belgium,  Germany, Austria and Italy; and much higher· 
seventy per thousand - to the East of the Elbe and the South of the Pyrenees.  Progress was so rapid 
in the East that in 1970 the distribution was completely reversed: mortality showed a North-South 
divide as the USSR,  Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic reached the low levels 
of the West.  Scandinavia and the Netherlands remained at the top with levels lower than fifteen 
per thouund, whereas the whole of the Southern Europe was behind with levels still over twenty· 
five per thousand and even close on fifty per thousand in Rumania, and fifty-five per thousand in 
Portugal. 
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11 This was followed by a new change of geography: infant mortality started to stagnate in the E.st · 
whereas it fell rapidly elsewhere.  In 1980 the dividing line between East and West was almost as 
exact  as  for mean  age  at marriage  or at  the  birth of the  first child.  At present,  the  gap has 
continued  to  widen.  The  same  sequence  would  a1so  be  observed  if the  trend  in  mens'  life 
expectancy or adult mortality were to be monitored. 
Consequently the main demographic flows have converged towards the creation of an identity, or 
rather a specific demographic nature, of Western Europe.  The combination of moderate migration 
and tate fertility, leaving aside a mortality differing from that of the East, has led to a development 
and an  age  structure specific to the  European  population.  It has  a trough,  which is specific to 
Europe, at the base of the age pyramid, a slower demographic growth and much·more accentuated 
ageing than in other developed countries and the East. 
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TWO CENTURIES  OF DEMOGIIAI'HIC CHANGE IN  THE LIFE  OF INDNIDUALS 
IN  THE AREA  OF  THE EUROPEAN UNION 
FaNeaching demographic changes take a long time to become established and  need  several generations 
before  their effects are  fully felt.  This  pseudo-inertia  of population  trends  conceals  the substantiBI 
changes  that have taken place in the main demographic parameters in the recent history of Western 
countries and in the lives of  men and women over the last 200  or 250 years, as the secular progression 
of these parameters shows. 
Overall life expectancy at birth has increased by at least a factor of 3 (increasing  from 25 to 75} and 
fertility has been divided by a factor of 3 or 4; infant mortality has been reduced by a factor of 25,· the 
duration of  life after  m~rriage has more than doubled and the age 111 which children lose 111 least one of 
their parents has increased by 30 years  (from  7  5 to 45}. 
In other words,  behind these relatively stark and not very explicit figures,  the conditions of individual 
life and  collective organisation have changed dramatically and have had to be adapted to the new  social 
situations created by demographic change.  Living longer does not solely mean gaining ye11rs of  life, but 
living In a different way, living longer with parents 11nd grandparents (even though this means inheriting 
at a later date} or supporting one's partner for 1 longer. period (Which may help to explain -to  som-. 
extent - the increase in divorces}.  States must also take steps to modify their legislation or organise the 
relationships  betwHn generations  in  different  ways through  social,  fiscal,  health and employment 
policies. 
At the  same  time,  however,  while  demographic  conditions  modify economic,  social and political 
conditions, they are not unconnected with or  due to external causes, but are the  product of  the changes 
in the other main sti1JCtures of society,  such as technology, production methods,  social relationships 
political ideologies,  etc.  This  means  that  major sectors  of our society  develop  through  complex 
processes of interdependence  and  mutu~l  interaction. 
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230 1.4  The  variables generating a North-South divide in the Union 
While there is little doubt, however. that differences with the East  and to a certain extent with 
America  and  Japan  have  become  more  marked,  differences  within  the  Union  should  not be 
underestimated.  Nothing is more uncertain than the convergence of several independent States 
towards a shared ethic. Within the overriding trend which is bringing the European Union towards 
a particular demographic model, there are still very active differences.  Some of these have been 
marked for some year~  . 
• 1 - Recent total fertility pattems 
Fertility, after reaching its lowest level, began to rise in some European countries between 1983 and 
1987.  This rise was not uniform: fertility patterns differed for the firat time in the period between 
the wars.  From the second half of the ·1980s, fertility increased reguiJrly in Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden.  There was a smaller recovery in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg.  In contrast, between 1985 and 1991, it 
fell in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal.  Trends in France. Switzerland and Austria have fluctuated 
with a drop In France and an increase in Switzerland and Austria. 
Whether or not the  countries  in question are 
part of the Union, there is therefore a consistent 
landscape  opposing  the  North  and  South  of 
Europe.  This will shape the future classification 
_of levels of completed fertility. Northern Europe 
has already outstripped the figures for the West 
and in particular the South.  These observations 
point to  a  possible  hypothesis:  is  the divide 
between the North and the South of the Union, 
recorded since the 1980s, no more in practice 
than  a  symptom  of converging  demographic 
behaviour?  This difference may well be linked 
to  the  different  status  of  women  in  the 
respective societies of these two parts of the 
Union,  since  it  is  mainly  the  variables 
concerning women that have shaped this  divide. 
Table 5 
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There seems to be a kind of •catching up• as regards women's demographic behaviour, which may 
ultimately lead to a greater demographic similarity between Member States. 
- 2 - Women's work 
In all European countries, working women have fewer children than other women.  Fertility might 
well be expected, therefore, to be greatest where the proportion of working women is lowest.  ln 
fact, the opposite is true.  In Northern Europe, where fertility is rising to levels close to-two children 
per woman, the majority of the female population works between the ages of 20 and 60.  In the 
South, in contrast, where fertility is decreasing and is still around 1.5 children,- most women are 
excluded from the labour market.  Rather than explaining  this contrast by women's status,  we 
undoubtedly need to look at aspirations. 
13 Should we see thisaaa short-term reaction or as along-term and far-reaching change rikely to affect 
the issue of the generations in question?  Perhaps the question should not be posed in thesi terms. 
The recent trend in fertility seems to show that behaviour can no longer be explained in terms of 
•calendar• and •intensity•, but rather by a combination ·of both.  If, for iNtance, women in the 
South,  believing  that  they  are  not  achieving  their  social  aspirations,  continue  to  postpone 
motherhood, their family aspirations could be curtailed. 
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A number of aspects linked to family formation show similar trends.  Events which have become 
commonplace In the North are still peripheral in the South: cohabitation prior to marriage, births 
outside marriage,  frequency  of divorce,  proportions of single-parent  families  and  reconstituted 
families. 
1.5  Disparities between Member States 
Population ageing is 1 development which ia now shared by all developed countries. It is, however, 
having different demographic and economic effects in the Member States of the European Union. 
From the demographic point of view, ageing depends on the initial age  structures to which it is 
applied, and these atructures vary from one Member State to another.  From the economic and 
financial point  of  view, the effect of  population IDeing depends on the-waysi't which the age-groups 
which economicaUy define this ageing are managed, on the regulations and legislation on social 
welfare linked to age (health,· penaiona, old age) and on the structure of the labour market Uenoth 
of employment, income levels, rate of participation by age and sex, -extent of unemployment).  It 
is not therefore surprising \hat examination of this trend points to a disparate situation. 
We concluded earlier that migration models were converging, in the sense thlt all Member States 
have become countries of immigration. The timetable, intensity and composition of migration flows 
are,  however,  factors shaping  differences  between  Member  States,  principally  for reasons  of 
geopolitical history. 
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. .... - 1 - Differential ageing In Member States 
Examination of the ageing of structures within the Union highlights two apparently contradictory 
trends: the current disparity between Member States, shown by different timetables and differences 
in the intensity of ageing, will lead in fifteen to twenty years' time to more similar relationships of 
dependence as regards the elderly. These relationships, whatever development hypothesis are taken 
11 a starting point, will undoubtedly grow. 
If the extreme groups, I.e.  the under-20s and  the  over-60s,  are  related  to total numbers aged 
between 20 and 59, the index for the Twelve is 0.82. The index for seven Member States is higher 
than this EU  average.  Ireland has the highest index (1.01) largely because its population still has 
1  very young structure, and therefore 1  substantial proportion of people aged 0 to 19.  Portugal, 
Spain and France,  which also have Indices higher than the average, are substantially in the same 
position.  In two other Member States, however, the index is higher than the average because of 
the high proportions of elderly people.  These are the United Kingdom and Belgium. 
Table 7 
Despite  the  fact  that  they  have  the  lowest 
proportions of young  people in the Union and 
elderly people already  account for one  fifth of 
their  total  population,  Germany  and  Italy 
currently have a smaller burden of demographic 
dependency  because  their  intermediate 
population  is  well  represented.  In  these 
countries,  however,  ageing  will  soon  have 
repercussions  from  the  point  of  view  of 
dependency.  In Luxembourg and Denmark, the 
larger proportion of young people will delay this 
development.  The  demographic  effects  of 
ageing are  least in the  Netherlands where the 
elderly  population  is  still  small  (17.6%),  the 
proportion of young people fairly high (24.6%) 
and  demographic  dependency  is  relatively 
moderate (0. 73). 
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On its own, demographic dependency shows linle more than the ratios between age groups.  If it 
is wished to deduce financial dependence from this, i.e. to measure an economic burden, a number 
of variables defining this dependency need to be added.  This work is complex and a large number 
of statistical indicators cannot be used because they are not available. The most that is possible is 
to compare the economic burden and the demographic burden by examining differentials among the 
active population. 
In 1992, 150 million people were part of the European Union's active population.  Expressed as 
rates of participation of the over-1 5s, these figures represent a participation of 67.8% among men 
and  44% among  women.  While  men's participation in the workforce  is  similar in extent in  all 
Member States and is generally around 65% or 70%, the same cannot be said of working women 
and t.he  participation of certain age-groups. 
As mentioned above, fewer women in the South of the Union have joined the labour force.  Just 
over one third of these women are economically active, as against close on half, and in some cases 
such as Denmark even more, in the Northern Member States.  Belgium is an exception here, with 
a women's participation rate which is still·below 40%. If these data are to be correctly interpreted, 
account should be taken of differences between men and women as regards working hours: full time 
work is the prevailing model for men, whereas part time work is very widespread among women. 
15 Amongst young workers aged 15 to 24, the differences between men and women are less marked. 
The difference here relates to the intensity of participation in different Member States.  The United 
Kingdom and Denmark stand out because of high rates for both sexes.  The same is true of the 
Netherlands and Germany. Elsewhere, young men's participation is lower than the overall level, and 
that of woman is higher, showing different carHr paths since women often take a break when 
families are formed. Among more elderly people, the male-female differences are more sizeable than 
ever.  Differences between men and women in the age groups reaching retirement age and the type 
of work carried out undoubtedly provide an explanation.  There may well be, however, a difference 
In generetional behaviour, in  that women presently on the _labour market have not adopted the model 
of their elders and cOntinue to work until older ages. 
Marked  differences among Member .States as 
regards wortc.  and unemployment, may have a 
aubltantiel Impact on our conclusions on the 
financial impact of demographic ageing. 
For  instance,  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
demographic dependency due to ageing is one 
of the highest in the Union: it occupie.s second . 
place.  If account is taken, however, of the high 
participation rate (76.2%t and the lower level of 
unemployment (8.  9%t, the real dependency that 
can be calculated, placing the United Kingdom 
in  seventh  position,  is  lower  than  that  of 
Member States which had, however, a younger 
age  structure  and  a  smaller  demographic 
dependency.  This  is  true of Italy,  which in 
terms of  demographic dependency was in eighth 
position In the Union and which, in view of low 
participation  rates  (61.8%)  and  1  high 
unemployment rate (10.1 %), is in sixth position 
from the point of view of it1 actual dependency. 
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In conclusion, classification of Member States by level of demographic dependency is completely 
overturned when the structure of the labour market is taken into account. 
• 3 •  SpecifiC features as regards stocks end flows of migrants 
It  is possible to see 1 cenain convergence in the Union in the area of migration since all the Member 
States have started to receive migrants from increasingly far·off areas over the last twenty or so 
years.  Historical differences  have  created specific national features  in this case  as  well.  The 
presence of North Africans in France is closely linked to the repercussions of the Algerian war.  The 
pruence of Turks in Germany i1 a result of labol.!r_ shortages in the po1t-war period.  In the United 
Kingdom, the presence of Indians and Pakistanis is a result of the Commonwealth. 
This  difference  can  also  be  seen -In  the rules  for obtaining the  various  nationalities  and their . 
lppi"ICatlon.  As will be seen in Chapter 4, however, migration has no impact in practice on the other 
demographic variables and in particular on demographic flows (fertility, mortality). 
16 .1.6  Future development scenarios 
We  shall  conclude  with  a  question:  how  can  the  demographic  future  of the  European  Union  be 
envisaged?  According to the United Nations most recent demographic projections, this future can be 
summarised as follows: 
1.  The total population seems unHkely to increase to any great extent (graph 1).  A maximum of slightly 
over 353 miiHon  inhabitants wm  be reached around the year 2005, i.e.  an increase of ftve  miiUon 
people from today.  Beyond that date there is Ukely to be a slow but constant decrease. The Union 
seems likely to lose approximately half a miiUon people each year, with the result that its population 
will be the same In 2020 as it is now: 348 million, but with a very different !!IDe structure. 
2.  The number of children aged under fifteen is likely to continue to fall (graph 2), entailing a decrease 
of between 18% and slightly under 15%. 
3.  After reaching a maximum of 237 million at the turn of the century, the population aged between 15 
and 64 should In turn start to decline (graph 3).  Between 1994 and 2020, this trend is likely to be 
reflected by the loss of 9 million pe_ople. 
4.  The number of elderly people aged over 65 will grow throughout the period of projection (graph 4). 
In 2020 this age group should include 70 miiHon people, i.e. 18 million people more than today.  As 
a proportion of the total population, it will therefore have increased from 1  5% to 20%. 
Are these forecasts meaningful?  Do they not need to be considered with some misgivings?  There are 
two ways of estimating the degree of uncertainty.  The first is to compare former projections with the 
actual population recorded and the second is to compare demographic projections with forecasts based 
on scenarios. 
The accuracy of old projections can be checked in table 9.  This table compares the real population in 
1980 and 1990 with the forecasts produced by the United Nations 20 years ftrlier.  This shows that the 
forecasts, in general and in the short term, under-estimated growth in the least populated Member States 
and over-estimated it for other Member States. The margins of· error of  these short- term forecasts have 
been  record~ for Portugal (underestimation  of 8.3%)  and  France  (overestimation  of 2.3%).  In  the 
medium term, over-estimation is widespread.  The total population of the Union was overestimated by 
0.5% in 1980 and 2.9% in 1990. 
There is lmle  doubt that this illustration is not representative of the quafity of more recent population 
projections.  The quality of  forecasts may vary from one period to another.  During the 1  Q60s and 1970s, 
it was very difficult to predict future trends in fertility and forecasts of future levels of  immigration are very 
problematic at present. The conditions under which projections are conducted have also improved: there 
has been a major improvement in data collection, resources and knowledge of demographic behaviour. 
Several empirical studies carried out at national level have also shown that projections are more Hkely 
to be incorrect for certain age-groups.  The size of the population of working age can be pr~dicted with 
a greater degree of certainty than the size of the population of young people who have not been born 
and the size of the population of the very old. 
This potential for errors makes it necessary to raise a key question: what will demographers of the turn 
of the century have disregarded?  They are no more sheltered from the caprices of History than their 
predecessors, which bears out the idea that it  is time to take demographic forecasting out of  its isolation. 
If it is to be efficient it must be accompanied by forward socio-economic and poHticaJ studies.  It must 
also take place over the very long term bearing in mind that demographic change goes ~ogether with 
social and poHtical change.  This redefinition of demography will obviously make it necessary to produce 
forecasts for shorter periods or to increase the number of scenarios. 
17 Table 9 
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It is  precisely in order to introduce this forward study element that the Statistical Office of the 
European  Communities  (Eurostatl  has  used  population  scenarios  rather  than  demographic 
projections. This ty~e  of  forecast explores the realistic boundaries of future demographic trends and 
does not aim to produce hypotheaes.  In other words, scenarios predict substantial uncertaintiet, 
whereas projections envisage maximum probability.  Eurostat has recently built up, for all Member 
States,  two long-term  development  scenarios  which  differ completely  from  one  another,  for 
population by region and for the active population by sex and by age. 
The  •low• scenario assumes: 
- fertility will continue to decline to a level of 1.5 children per woman among recent generations; 
•  a slight  increase  in  life  expectancy  to  the  end  of the  century,  then  a levelling  off of life 
expectancy; 
- an abrupt fall in immigration levefs in the Union.  The migration balance is likely to drop from its 
1990 level of 1 million to an annual level of 250 000 people; 
- the gradual, but fess  pronounced, continuation of recent trends in participation rates,  i.e.  an 
increase for women and a decrease. for _men. 
In the case of international and regional variations, the low scenario assumes that many processes 
of convergence will stagnate. 
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7 The •high• scenario assumes, in contrast, that processes of convergence will continue in the Union. 
The impact of this convergence is quantified using the following indicators: 
- achievement of a generational fertility level of two children per woman; 
- continued increase in life expectancy; 
- reduction of migration balances to an annual level of 750 000 people after 1994; 
•  continued growth in women's work and an upturn in men's work to the levels recorded in tht 
second part of the 1970s. 
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The results of the forecasts based on these two European Union scenarios show that, in the period 
1990·2000: 
- The number of teenagers, young adults, and people reaching the age of eighty will undoubtedly 
fall, while the number of people in their thirties, forties, early fifties, early sixties, seventies and 
the very old will undoubtedly increase: 
- If the present low fertility level continues  (low scenario),  the number of young children will 
decrease again, but if it shows an upturn (high scenario), there will be a small-scale baby boom; 
- The reduction in the number of young people and very young workers cannot be avoided, and 
will take place at the same time as numbers of older working people (aged 30 to 551  increase; 
- If the  low participation  rate  of the over-55s proves  untrue, tht oldest group of the  active 
population  will ultimately decrease in number; if current trends in these  rates  are  reversed, 
however, there could be a considerable increase in this category of people. 
Uncenainties about the future population increase with time.  Whatever the case may be, it is now 
accepted that during the next twenty-five years the Union will have to take account of an increasing 
number of elderly people, both young  peniioners and the very okf. The number ofpeoi:Jfe aged .over 
50, currently 110 million, will be between 142 and  155 million in 2020.  · 
The  population of 20-34-year-olds .  will probabtv decrease.  Even  if the  Union. recorded  a net 
migr,tlon flow of 750 000 immigrants each year (high scenario), the population of working age 
would decrease by eight million people. 
Long-term estimates of groups of children, teenagers and  young adults are very dubious.  These 
categories could increase or substantially decrease depending on trends in fertility levels. 
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20 According to the development scenarios for the active population, the number of workers seems set 
to increase up to the year 2000 in both a pessimistic and an optimistic scenario. This positive trend 
is due to two events: variations in age structure play the major part, but in some Member States the 
behavioural effect, i.e. the increase in the number of working women, plays a more substantial part. 
Over the last five years,  for instance,  there  has been  a positive variation in participation in  the 
Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium largely as a result of the increase in working 
women. 
Evaluations of demographic dependency must in this case  take  account of this increase  in  the 
number of working women as this could absorb a proportion of demographic mishaps. 
It  needs to be borne in mind, however, as shown in graph 8, that there are major uncertainties about 
the development of the active population in the long term.  There is a twofold uncertainty, relating 
on the one hand to the development of the population structure and, on the other hand, to that of 
participation in economic activity.  This uncertainty is particularly marked among working people 
aged over 60. 
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In the equation balancing workers and non-workers, a differentiation needs to be made between 
economically useful workers, their degree of usefulness and the length of this usefulness.  At this 
point,  we  will  merely  observe  that  intergenerational  balances .are  threatened  and  that  their 
development  will  be  based  on  the  combination  of three  factors:  increase  in  women's  work, 
continuation of men's work, increase in •useful• work.  For this purpose, it  is not just the job supply 
that needs to support this growth, but isolutions also need to be  found,  in the case  of women's 
work, so that the family is no longer an obstacle to work. 
21 Chapter 1 
Key points for further consideration 
1.  The  European  Union's  demographic  size.  which  places  it at the  top of the  developed 
countries and in third position in the world, makea it one of the major players on the world 
scene.  From 1 geo-potiticll point of view, it is 1 key axis for the populations surrounding it, 
whether in the Mediterrane1n b11in or in the centre and east of Europe.  These two regions 
of the world are encountering problems of various economic, social and political types and 
the  Union has a key role to play in helping these regions to develop and become genuine 
trading and politlcll partners of the Union.  · 
2.  As part of the developed world, the European Union has not evolved in the same way as Ita 
partners.  In comparison  with North America  and  Australia,  the  Union  has  managed  to 
provide its citizens with 1  better quality of life. as the indicators relating to mortality, life 
expectancy and infant mortality show.  In comparison with Japan, it has given its citizens 
1 more egalitarian status. by· offering, for instance~ niore equal opportunities for  men-and 
women.  It is therefore Important for the Union to maintain its principles of social protection 
and equal opportunities, despite the new demographic trends and in particular population · 
ageing. 
3.  There is some convergence of demographic behaviour within EU Member States. although 
differences in level are continuing as a re.sult of timelags.  The mobility of European Union 
citizens has changed character since movement is now free and no longer  -generates mass 
migration.  All  the  Member  States  have  become  host  countries  for  non:EU  citizens. 
Mortality has fallen everywhere in the European Union and the differences  which existed 
even  ten years ago have levelled out.  Mortality and migration have a direct link with the 
economic situation. 
4.  According_ to the  scenarios  of demographic  development  that have  been  put forward, 
continued convergence or a stagnation of this process would both have a  m1jor 1m pact on 
the future structure and size of the Union population.  These scenarios need to be refined 
and  produced  in larger  numbers  so  that the  effects of the  different parameters  can  be 
measured independently. 
22 CHAPTER II 
TRENDS  IN AGE  STRUCTURES 
Despite timelags, there seems to be some convergence in overall demographic trends within the European 
Union.  This is true of mortality profiles which ate all moving in the direction of increased life expectancy; 
it ia  true of fertility where, despite calendar  variations, differences between MefTiber States are being· 
reduced in terms of completed fertility and it is also true of migration which is not having a significant 
effect on population anywhere. 
When these developments are applied, however, to ·different age structures, they may produce a marked 
disparity between Member States as regards the ratios between people belonging to different age-groups 
and as regarda the size of these groups.  Many aspects of our economic, social and political organisation 
are rightly based on age: compulsory education, legal age of majority, right to work, retirement, financial 
benefits for certain public services, etc.  The active pop_'-JI•tion is also recruited from an age-group which 
may wen be large but is relatively demarcated. If  the balance between the active population and the non-
active population is lost, other balan.ces which depend on it, in particular the financial balance, may well 
be affected.  · 
The aim of this chapter is to update current and predicted age structures for Member States, to clarify the 
demographic mechanisms which have led to these structures and to sketch out tbe longer-term challenges 
that the modifications of this age structure entail for the European Union. 
2.1  Age structures in the European Union 
like most Western countries, the European Union is recording a rise in all the indicators pointing to the 
ageing of  its age structures, As, however, an •ageing• P.PP~.Jlation structure is not necessarily a population 
with an old structure, it is useful to bear in mind some of the mechanisms intrinsic to the ageing process 
before attempting any analysis. 
2.1 •  1 The ageing of structures 
Demographic ageing is no more than a transformation of the age  structures of a population.  While its 
mechanitms are relatively complex, it is relatively simple to describe.  It entails a situation in which the 
older age-groups are increasing in proportional terms to the younger age-groups; in other words, where the 
average age of the population as a whole is increasing. 
Sometime after it has started, demographic ageing is accompanied by an increase in the absolute number 
of elderly people,  but at the beginning of the process,  when the birth rate is faHing  and the number of 
children decreasing, the number of elderly people does not necessarily increase, even if the proportion of 
the total population for which they account does increase. 
This is no longer the case in the European Union: nowadays, most ageing parameters are developing in a 
similar way: increase in the number of elderly people - especially the very elderly - in absolute terms and 
aa a percentage, and in the average age of the total population and of the niain age-groups (adults and the ·  ·  -
elderly).  This,  as  will be seen  below, is a sign that ageing is well and truly underway and that it wilt 
continue in the long term whatever changes take place in the younger age-groups. 
23 2.1.2 The mature structure of the European Union: review and prospects 
• 1 •  The age pyramid • an lncr11slngly narrow base  Graphique 9 
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It  might  be  wondered  whether  the  term  •age 
pyramid•  is  in keeping  with the  situation of th• 
Union population, especially as it ii. now far from 
the triangular shape which gave it its name. 
It  has a narrow base as a result of  the relatively low 
fertility levels of the Union. ·The most numerous 
age· groups are currently the 20-39-year-olds who 
account  for  29.8%  of the  total  population.  In 
future, however, the 40·59-year-olds will become 
the largest group.  This is important from the point 
of view of the structure of the active population. 
~ ...  ,  The apex of this pyramid shows the arrival of larger 
••••I  numbers  among  the  oldest  age-groups  (80  and 
l  ~...  over).  The magnitude of  .~his age-group becomes 
••  ••  ••  ••  ••  ••  ••  •  •  ..  .. 
:  increasingly evident if it is related  to the  younger. 
·  ~ ...  ·  groups  (0·19).  There  is  a ratio  of four  elderly 
I  •  I·  people to five young people (which ratio is likely to 
....  ._  .. __  - •fUIIl 
. increase in the future).  Within the elderly group, 
moreover, the ratio of those aged  80 and  over to 
those aged 80-79 is 1 to 5.  This also seems set to 
increase,  when larger groups reach the age of 80. 
Over and above the ageing of the population reflected by the increase in the proportion of those aged 
60 and over, there is currently, therefore, a second ageing within the group of the elderly where the 
over-80s are increasing in proportional terms.· 
Tabla 10 
Population by broad age groups and by sex 
on 1.1.1993, 
and some ageing Indicators 
mill  !l.!!lA!I  !Alii 
0-19  12,5  11,9  24,4 
20-59  27,9  27,5  55,4 
20·39  15,7  15,1  30,8 
40-59  12,3  12,3  24,6 
60+  8,3  - 11.9  20,2 
60-79  7,2  .  9,3  -16,5 
80+  1,1  2,6·  3,7 
Mean age of EU population  38 years 
Ageing ratio (60 + )1(0·191  0,83 
Dependency ratio ((0-19) +  (60 +  )11(20-59)  0,81 
Old active/young active r~tlo (40·59)1(20-39)  0,80 
Ageing intensity (80 + 1/(60·  79)  0,22 
24 One fact is evident: •bottom-up• ageing due principally to the decrease in the birth rate, which has long 
been  predominant,  is  gradually  being  replaced  by  •top-down•  ageing  due  to an  increase  in  life 
expectancy to very old ages.  All the structural •mishaps• due to historic events (wars, crises and/or 
short·  term fluctuations of demographic parameters) leave their mark on the pyramid long after they have 
taken place. 
- 2 - Stable dependency tltloa, but a significant ageing of the active population 
Most demographic ageing  coefficients,  I.e.  Indicators through which it is possible to measure  its 
different dimensions, progress during the period 1950-2025.  The progreuion is slow for some and 
rapid for others and reflects the extent of the changes in balances due to ageing.  These indicators are 
based on a notion of economic burden, linked to aoe  management practices in our societies. 
The  ratio  of the  elderly  (60 +)  to the  young 
( <20) is the moat rapid trend, but is reversed 11 
regards  the  coefficient of dependency  which 
starts to decrease after the year 2000.  .· 
In contrast,  this population of working ·age  is 
likely  to  undergo  incr~ased  Internal  ageing:  · 
starting  at  the  beginning  of the  1990s,  this 
ageing will increase substantially over the next 
fifteen years.  The gradual entry of the baby-
boom•rs,  I.e.  the age-groups of the  post-war 
period, into working life and soon retirement, Is 
therefore having Its initial impact.  It is this that 
will  contribute  to  a  substantial  increase  in 
ageing  from  the  next century  onwards.  The 
generations  born  between  t 945  and  1  965, 
whose numbers are in some eaaes 30% higher 
than  those  of  the  generations  preceding  or. 
fonowing  them,  will  reach  retirement  age 
between  2000  (in  the  case· .of  those  retiring 
early)  and  2025 (in the case  of those retiring 
later)  with a peak around 2015.  The financial 
burden  of  these  surplus  non-workers  will 
therefore  weigh  more  heavily  on  the  smaller 
number of workers. 
This •knock-on• effect of the baby-boomers is 
also incontrovertible and measurable, since the 
protagonists are already on the scene and their 
chances  of  survival  are  known  with  some 
accuracy. 
Lastly, there is an •ageing within ageing•, i.e. 
the proportion of  the over-80s to 60 to 80-year- . 
olda  will really start to increase .over,.the next 
few years. 
These overall data for the Union, however, may 
be  shaped  by  compensatory  effects  among 
Member States;. it is therefore necessary to look 
at the situation in each of  these Member States. 
• • •  Graphs 1  0 - 11  .. 
TNndl Ill eOIN qelflt hMicatott 
ftom 1MO ...  1110, aiMI ffOM 1111 to 2020 
ecco'*'t to E1110etat eceuMe 
~~---------------------------------
[INrly .__..,  rllio 1111 +111:10-MI  ,.trr-1"-~~~::::~: 
~~--------------~~--~--~~--~~  ---------------
~~--------------------------------- .... ,  ... ..;.,.,..  "" ...  ,  .....  ,  .. -- ............ 
315+-------------------------------
~~---------------------------~- ~"'  ..... .,  •11110  +I  ---~-
~ _.,..----.41'·...., ....  ··········~;,;,;,;···· 
,.+-~------~--.c--------------------~L-
'-~-~..,-~  .  oe...- .  ._~  __  ,.... ________________________  __ 
- ·- filii  ....  - .... ·- - ,...  - - ..  ,  -
25 2. 1.3  Disparities between Member States 
• 1 •  Age pyramids with very different shapes 
The profiles of the age pyramids of Member States are not at all identical  (see  the annexed age 
pyramids for Member States). 
Ireland has the most •conventional• and also the youngest structure, even if the initial two age· 
groups have been pointing to a fall in the birth rate for ten years or so.  Spain and Portugal also have 
fairly uniform structures where a baby boom effect is not very visible.  Thia confirms that the 
timetable of •top·down• ageing will come later in the countries of the South (including Greece) than 
in the countries of the North.  Curiously, It Ia the Mediterranean countries which have bun In top 
position as regards •bottom·up•  ___ age_lng _f~  IOf!'~ ten v~ars or so with a sharp decline in the birth 
rate.  -·  - - - - - - -- - ·- -- ·  -
Germany has the most irregular pyramid ai a result of its turbulent history (wave of births after the 
war followed by a wave of massive immigration in the 1950s). 
The French pyramid shows that it has had the longest period of high fertility and that the decline 
in fertility has been lower and slower than among its neighbours.  The Dutch pyramid _shows one 
of the greatest contrasts due to variations in the birth rate between  1945 and  1965. 
In the United Kingdom, the b~by  boom reached a peak of births in 1965, which will help to delay 
the time at which the repercussions of the baby boom on ageing will be felt. 
The imbalances between the sexes at older ages are particularly marked in Germany and Belgium. 
• 2 •  Ageing coefficients 
Examination of a number of indices measuring the nature  of ageing takes  further account of the 
differences  between  Member States.  This is of particular interest,  as  each  of these  indices is 
associated  with consequences that are specific to it. 
•  r  ·~  ,  ;  •  •  ,  .,  •• ,.  ••  _. 
The ageing coefficient relates the oldest to the youngest.  1t evaluates the demographic situation, 
by measuring whether and to what extent ageing is likely to increase, hence its name.  This indicator 
shows 1 clear-cut line between four groups: (  1  ) Member States in which the indicator is low, where 
the older age-groups clearly eclipse the new generations are, in order, Germany, Belgium and Italy; 
(2)  Member States where this situation is not so pronounced,  but is on  the point of becoming 
pronounced  because  fertility trends are  not being  reversed,  are  Denmark,  Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom and Greece; (3) four Member States· Spain, Portugal, France and the Netherlands- have 
better balanced numbers of the oldest age-groups: (4) the situation in Ireland differs as its younger 
generations are strongly represented. 
The dependency ratio is not used to find out about a demographic future, but rather an immediate 
economic weight.  As the term and the categories are not chosen at-ral}dom, it  attempts to compare 
•non-workers•, i.e. those who have not yet reached  working age  (0-19)  and those  who are no 
longer working (60 + ),  with •workers•. or_ J\ least those who are of a working age (20·59).  The 
index has to be viewed with caution as it is based on only one of the variables··which pliy a pan in 
real  economic  dependency.  It measures,  to a substantial 'extent, -the  StruCture  of the  active 
population (unemployment, women's work) or the struCture of financial transfera·(social security 
payments, income levels).  The larger the gips between Member States in these areas, the less 
comparable the dependency ratios are.  The Union is currently in this situation with the-result that 
care has to be taken in interpreting this ratio. Another weakness is that the indicator does not take 
account of a  possible difference of •economic burden•  between  the  youngest and  the oldest 
generations.  This makes It  possible to  illustrate a situation, unrealistic it  is true, but very convincing, 
of two population structures whose deJ)endencv ratios are identical. 
26 -
Population aged over 60  - -
Population of working age  - -
Young population 
These few considerations highlight the need to comment on dependency ratios in the Member States 
in the light of other indicators that have already been  analysed.  It is only irt this  way that it is 
possible to interpret the Irish r~tio, by far the largest, 11 d~e  to a large extent to the dependency of 
young people.  It can also be aeen that higher proportions of elderly people are exerting greater 
pressures on  Belgium and  Italy than on Germany,  because Germany-has a higher proportion of 
people of working age.  lt  can also be seen that dependency is accentuated in Member States which 
do not have the most significant ageing: Portugal,  France~ United Kingdom, Spain and Greece. 
-.  ~  - - . .  --
Whatever the case may be,  the figures are clear:  there is no mechanical,  one·way link between 
demographic ageing and economic burdens with the result that refinements need to be introduced 
into the age-groups and a number of other variables need to be included. 
Finally, the Intensity of ageing is measured by the ratio of people aged over 80 to those who are 
younger but already retired (60 to 79). The Member State having the largest proportion of the very 
elderly is France.  This proportion is lowest in Portugal.  The differences between Member States, 
currently low,  will become more explicit over the next few decades.  France,  Germany  and the 
United Kingdom, i.e. those Member States which currently have the largest proportions of the very 
elderly, could well be overtaken, in particular by Greece and Italy, in the next twenty years. 
2.2  The causes of ageing 
Demographic ageing  is not true  of all  populations.  For  centurkls,- even millennia,_ demographic 
evolution was not refletted by any significant ageing ofpopulations, the proportion of elderly people 
remaining at fevers  which were insignificant in practice (less than 5% for the over-65s).  It is also 
true that the birth and death rates have hardly evolved at all during most of the history of humanity, 
reaching a ceiling at very high levels of relative balance. 
Demographic ageing could start to soar only. when the Western demographic transition started, 
paving the way for a movement away from a traditional demographic system with high mortality and 
fertility  rates  towards  a  •modern•  system  where  these  variables  are  low.  The  history  of 
demographic ageing is therefore relatively recent.  In Europe, it dates back no  more  than  two 
centuries In countries where this transition started early and no more than one century for those 
where the transition came later. 
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Belgium 
Denmark 
Genneny 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
lt  ..  y 
Luxembourg 
Neth  ...  ends 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
EUIUZ 
SOUtr»: lii&ltNUt • 
.Percentage of the EU population aged 80 end over in the total population (TP) end among the over 60-s 
.1!!!  UNtO  .l..!H  .1!!!  2000  zg  2000  zooo  12U  UD 
IO+ITP  10+110+  80+1TP  10+/80+  80+fTP  80+/60+  10+/TP  80+/80+  IO+fT'P  80+/60+ 
Low  LDw  High  High  LDW·  Low 
1,8  10,5  2,&  14,1  . 3,5  15,9  3,5  1&,2  4,9  11,4 
1,&  10,4  2.8  ,.4,8  4.,1  20,2  4.1  20,&  4,2.  18,1 
~.s  9,0  2,7  14,0  3,3  14,8  3,4  15,1  5,2  11,7 
1,3  11,0  2,3  13,3  '3,7  15,5  3.7  15,9  5,5  21,1 
1,2  9,4  1,7  11,3  3,5  11,5  3,5  16,9  4,9  19,3 
2,0  1 t,a  3,0  17.5  3,4  18,9  3,4  17,2  4,9  19,2 
1,1  12,2  1,9  12,5  2,7  17,1  2.7  17,&  3,1  13,8 
1,3  9,7  2,2  12.7  3,5  15,3  3,6  15,7  5,9  20,7 
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HitJh  High 
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5,5  21,4 
4,8  18,8 
8,0 .  22,8 
8,1  24,8 
5,4  23,3 
5,4  21,8 
3,1  •  18,4 
8,5  24,0 
4.5  19,1 
4,3  18,0 
4,8  22,1 
4,9  -20,4 
5,6  22.0 2.2.  1  Falling fertility, responsible for "bottom11p" ageing 
While falling fertility is an important historical factor,  it has not been  continuous in the post-war 
period.  An initial period during which ageing slowed down 11 1  result of the upturn in fertility 
between 1945 and 1  965 (the b•by boom) was followed by a period of intensification linked to the 
massive declin'll in fertility from 1965 to the present, with a slight trend towards a levelling off or 
upturn since the 1990s.  Chapter 3 gives detailed data on fertility and analyses these data. 
Future trends in fertility are very uncertain and it is not yet clearly known whether it will stabilise, 
whether and  to what extent it will start to increase,  or  whether it will fall  again  after a short 
recovery,  At present, the most likely hypothesis- or in any case the hypothesis put forward most 
frequently  - seems  to be  a gradual stabilisation around  1  threshold  which is not far from  the 
generation replacement level (for instance 1.8 Or 1.9 children per woman), which would limit, but 
would not completely eliminate, the impact of fertility on ageing.  -
2.2.2  Continuing increases in life expectancy, or "top~own" ageing 
The decline in mortality, or more precisely its age structure, points to another cause of ageing.  This 
decline affects the top of pyramid as increasing numbers of the oldest people continue to survive. 
- 1 - life expectancy: general Increase and convergence of levels in the Union 
The second cause of ageing is the increase in average life span and in particular in life expectancy 
at adult ages.  In the European Union, these two developments are part of a continuation of the first 
epidemiological transition, when deaths due to infectious diseases declined sharply, which ended 
everywhere In Western Europe around  1950 or  1960.  This  first epidemiological  transition was 
followed by a new period of declining mortality due, this time, to changes in lifestyles and advances 
in the treatment of organic degenerative diseases (cancer,  cardiovascular diseases). 
In the second quarter of the 20th century, life expectancy on birth differed by ten years between 
the least favoured Member States and the others.  In the Southern Member States (Spain, Greece 
and  Portugal),  life expectancy  on binh was just over  SO  for women,  but was ·well  ove,- 60 in 
Denmark and the Netherlands for both men and women. 
Member States which had lagged behind in the past made up for this delay during the 1970s. They 
are  now among  the  leaders.  In  sixty years,  therefore,  Spanish  women  gained  a  further  life 
expectancy of 30 years, whereas Danish women, whose gain in life expectancy came earlier, only 
achieved half of this figure. 
The 19701 were a period of major progress for men and women in all  Member States. This trend 
shows that declining mortality is the result of a process involving a complex interaction of  biological 
factors and the environment, helped by the methods of socio-economic organisation of societies. 
Nowadays in the Europe of Twelve, life expectancy is 72.9 years for men and over 79 for women, 
tending towards a gain of one additional year approximately every four years. 
• 2 •  Future prospects for increased life span 
There is some uncertainty about increasing longevity.  There may be surprises in store which may 
belie many of the current forecast hypotheses which are  rather pessimistic as  regards a future 
c:fecline in mortality.  If the rate ofdeciine observed since the 1980s were to continue or •peed up, 
and average life span was, for instance, around ninety years within the next thirty or forty years, 
ageing  would then make  considerable progress and  wo.Jid  exceed  all  the  current demographic 
forecasts for 2025 or 2050. 
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The  potential  progression  of  viral  epidemics 
such as AIDS, or increases in morbidity linked to 
increasing pollution and environmental damage 
seems, however, to urge caution. 
What  do  the  figures  show?  The  continuing 
decline  in  mortality at  very  old  ages  even  in 
Member States which have relatively low  levels, 
in  particular  France,  tends  to  suggest  that 
further reductions of mortality are still possible. 
This also seems to be borne out by the absence 
of a concentration of deaths at very old  ages 
around a limit threshold. 
Deaths at high ages are still very dispersed.  At 
present there  seems  to be  nothing to prevent 
the gain of an additional year of life, at least in 
the short term, every 3 to 4 years as is the case 
at present. 
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.-2.3  The economic and social impact of ageing 
The prospect of an increued life span for everyone has changed attitudes and behaviour. The social 
need  ~or procreation for the  purposes of group reproduction is no longer a collective constraint. 
Work no longer occupies more than a small part of the life capital available.  Free time and leisure 
are taking ita place.  Savings and investments can be made over much longer periods and used to 
finance long-term projects with little risk of compromise by an early death. 
These considerations bear out the idea that the ageing of populations is not simply a demographic 
matter but, more than a simple modification of age structures, has become an·  overall problem of 
society.  It has more, further reaching and more subtle implications than has long been supposed. 
Over and above the very real questions raised by this development in the area of family policy, of 
financial balance  between the generations and of differential.systems for financing pensions, it 
needs to be tackled from a forward-looking and dynamic point of view.  In this section we shall look 
at some key areas in which the main issues of ageing in the Union are having an impact. 
2.3.1  Profound change in the life cycle: more free time 
Birth-education-work-death was for long the fate of most men and women.  Nowadays, birth and 
death still bound the  human  adventure, but the time interval which separates  them has  become 
much greater with a long period of inactivity prior to death.  Education now lasts longer than ever. 
The  most  change  has  taken  place  as  regards  work,  whose  nature  and  intensity  have  been 
transformed. 
In slightly over a century, the working hours of an urban manual worker in industrialised countries 
has fallen from approximately 4000 hours per year, without a free evening,  without a weekend, 
without  holidays  and  without  retirement,  to  approximately  1600 hours  with  free  time  which 
overtook working time between 1975 and 1985.  This development is not just linked to periods of 
prosperity as it has continued during periods of recession as well.  This change in working practices 
Is no more than the result of a far-reaching technological, economic, social and ultimately cultural 
revolution. 
It  is not therefore unreasonable to put forward the hypothesis that, as past trends continue, working 
hours will be reduced in the future in one of three conventional ways: reduction of daily or weekly 
hours, increase in holiday periods, reduction of the number of working years.  Assuming 30 hours 
per week,  40 weeks  per year and 33  ·years of working life,  provided that the  male life span  has 
reached 80 by this time, working time would account for only 6% of the total life span.  The result 
would be an increase of some 53% in free time. 
Demographic ageing therefore raises the fundamental structural implications, even greater in the 
longer term, of  the technological progress that we have generated making it  necessary rapidly to find 
ways of  adapting our attitudes, behaviour, institutions and methods of  organisation to this evolution. 
It is very inviting when anticipating the future, on the basis of current ageing,  to put forward very 
daring hypotheses such as a future life cycle where a new period devoted solely to the family would 
take  its place  between  •education  time•  and  work time.  This  free  time  also  opens  up  major 
prospects for continuing training and leisure. 
At present, however, ageing is presenting society with two immediate and considerable challenges: 
how to maintain economic performance with a smaller and older labour force and how to ensure the 
same  level of social protectton  for increasing numbers of social  security claimants with greater 
chances of survival. 
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The  relationship between population and employment covers two questions: the correspondence 
between volume of  employment and workers and the correspondence between types of  employment 
and workers' qualifications.  The structure of  the labour market (workers, non-workers, unemployed 
pllople, nature of jobs, etc.) depends on these balances.  If one of these parameters is modified, the 
whole equilibrium of the system is affected. 
- 1 - Relationship between numbers of workers and volume of employment 
It may be said in practice that employment/population imbalances are a constant phenomenon, since 
it  is true that the labour market and the labour force are continuously changing. History often shows 
considerable divergences in this area.  In the post-war period, several Western States had to call 
upon large numbers of foreign workers to make up for the local labour force deficit.  What is new, 
however, is the present nature of the imbalance .and possibly its extent.  There is a shortage of work 
rather than  a shortage of workers,  and  therefore  an  imbalance caused  in the  first instance  by 
economic factors rather than as a consequence of demographic factors.  -
Nobody would  deny,  however,  that demographic  dev~-lopments make  these  imbalances  more  . 
worrying, but instead of merely blaming the Inability to finance the age risk on a lack of income, it 
would be  better to attack the roots of the problem.  Job creation  has to be  seen  as  a priority 
objective In this area.  At the same time, it may be useful to examine the distribution of resourct:s 
between all the social partners, In societies which are continuing to become more wealthy, and to 
rethink the economic and social usefulness of the growing category of the population formed by the 
elderly. 
At the same time, a way of making work more flexible needs to be found. 
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This is the root of the problem: the total amount 
of work  available ls tending  to  decrea~~ as--
techniCit progress is made; new activitiu with 
a high concentration of human capital are  not 
offsetting lossn of employment due to more 
intense automation.  These activities could, for 
instance,  be  in  the  field  of  information  and 
communications technologiea,  where reaearch 
and development require major investments of 
-human time. · 
Most experts foreaH a decrease in the volume 
of employment.  The consequences of this can 
only t)e'-offset by a reduction of working houri 
(whether daily, wnkly or annual).  The  active 
population  will continue  to increase up to the 
next millennium at least, as a result of the entry 
of the luby  boomers into the labour market and 
the potential inc:reau in the numbers of working 
women. · There  is  therefore  likely to be  more 
pressure on employment in future years. 
In  the  past,  man's  participation  rates  were 
around  1  00%  at  all  agea  of  working  life 
between  1  5  and  65  and  slightly  less  in  the 
extreme  age-groups  (15-19  and  60-64).  This 
situation was stiU true around  1950, but since 
.  then the profiles of the participation curves have 
changed substai'\tiaRy: while men'  1 participation 
in  economic  activity  is  still  maximum  at the 
central ages  (between  25 and· 50),  there  has 
been a very substantial decrease in participation 
among young and elderly adults: this is due, on 
the one hand, to lonGer periods of education and 
training which may continue in some cases  to 
the  age  of 25 and,  on  the other hand,  to the 
effects of the lowering (in some countries such 
as France) of the statutory age of retirement or 
the  implementation  of  early  retirement 
programmes as well 11 1 general lowering of the 
actual age at which people give up work, which 
is  becoming  earlier  and  earlier  in  many 
countries. 
These  prac;tices -have  substantially  modified 
peoplei'  _life .cycle•·' During the 19~s  or 1960s, 
-many  Europeans . hid  a  working  life : of . 
approximately  45  yurs  with  .  15  years  of 
retirement, whereas today they are mare likely 
to work for 35 to 4Q years and be retired for 20. 
to 25 years;  the  ratio has fallen from thtee to 
one to two to one or Jess. 
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Working lives are  not only shoner nowadays, 
but increasingly erratic with alternating periods 
of  work  and  unemployment  and  periods  of 
retraining  and  redeployment.  This  is  not 
without  an  impact  on  workers'  ability  to 
accumulate old-age capital or pension rights .on 
a  par  with  those  available  to  current 
beneficiaries. 
For some years there has been a substantial increase in the number of women on the labour market. 
At present the curve of women'  a participation rates in Europe is very similar to tht curve for men 
except that there is a timelag at the bottom and a more rapid outflow after 40.  The negative curve 
between 15 and 30, reflecting the effects of marriage and fertility, has disappeared and has been  · 
replaced by a very marked upward trend. 
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Entry into the static category of the ·over-60s· 
does  not  mean  that  everyone  stops  work 
everywhere.  The  statutory  ages  at  which 
people can retire still vary considerably from one 
country  to  another  and  departure  from  the 
labour market may be later in some professions 
or in some sectors of activity. 
Approximately 6 300 000 of the over-60s work 
in  the  European  Union,  including  4 300 000 
men  and  2 000 000  women.  Most· people 
working in the services (over 60~  of women,· 
and  employees  continue to work beyond 60. 
Among the over-60s still working, however, the 
proportion of employers and the self  ...  mployed. 
is  higher than  in the  remainder  of the  active 
population. 
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• These workers are not affected by the statutory age of retirement and can freely continue to work 
· to an elderly age.  A breakdown by sectors of activity shows that the same is true of farmers, who 
are proportionally more numerous after the age of 60 than before.  Lastly, part-time work is more 
widespread amongst elderly workers than among the young (5  times more among men and  1.6 
times among women). 
• 2 •  Correspondence _between tvPII of employment and workers' quantlcations 
If the  total population is ageing,  it ia  evident that the active population  is  also ageing.  This 
conclusion Is often put forward as one of the main sources of concern and problems.  Is an older 
labour force more of a handicap from thl point of view of economic performance than a younger 
labour force?  Many  argume~  woul.d uem to  be~  ,~i~  .o~~:  _larger t:'umbers of elderly wortutra coat 
more in a system where  salary  scales  are  linked  to age;  these  aame  workera  will have  many 
handicaps: reduced productivity and geographi~l  and professional mobility, lesaability to adapt to 
new technologies and greater absenteeism "due to inness and disability  • 
.  .  - ..  - .. 
These  arguments  are  less. and  leas.. in keeping .  ~ith ~e current situation of 4Q·to-60-year-old 
workera.  They can be counterbalanced by arguments that are just as valid: the ageing of the labour 
force Increases the average qualification level of the active population because workers are more 
experienced, thereby reducing the costs of training and apprenticeship. 
This  still leaves,  however,  the  Question  of the  balance  between  employment and  population. 
Drawing more sophisticated conclusions from the demographic parameter alone would not be very 
credible or meaningful.  Analysis has to be based on a larger number of empirical variables. not just 
demographic but economic and social as well, and should be able to measure their correlations.  The 
juxtaposition of two data is not just Inadequate in this case,  tsut dangerous as well.  A resolutely 
forward-looking  view  also  needs  to be  adopted,  as  the  current  situation  is  based  on  a  past 
employment model which differs substantially from that of the future as regards working hours, 
professional  life  cycle,  nature of work,  capitalization  as  well as  accumulated  rights.  Using  a 
simplifying strategy would simply impede the quest for more comprehensive solutions within the 
framework of integrated age and employment policies. 
2.3.3  Social protection expenditure 
The arrival of larger numbers of claimants having greater chances of survival will inevitably step up 
the volume of social protection expenditure. 
• 1 •  Financing of retirement pensions 
The financing of retirement pensions is generally seen as .  the key problem raised by population 
ageing. It  immediately raises two Questions: despite increasing numbers of  claimants and decreasing 
numbers of contributors, can old-age insurance systems continue to. operate as in the past?  Which 
is more in keeping with the new pressures exerted by ageing: financing based on a principle of 
distribution or financing based_ on a principle of capitalisation  1 
The  demographic dimention o_f  the_ financing  of .-retirement pensions is only one  aspect of the 
problem.  Developments such as slower economic growth and increasing unemployment, which 
reduce income and increaae burdens, are more directly •responsible• for the incr~ased  cost of social 
security.  This has been demonstrated by studies carried ~  al, national level which have evaluated 
the purely demographic burden of ageing in a distribution system. 
- .  - .  -
In the debate on systems of financing retirement pensions, demographers are often asked whether 
it  is preferable, during a period of  population ageing, to use a _capitalisation rather than a pay-as-you-
go lyatem. 
35 The  potential  risks of this  kind  of development  are  immediately  evident:  basic  schemes  may 
gradually be prevented from adjusting to trends in the cost of living index so that supplementary 
schemes can take up the baton in the interests of the financial survival of these protection systems 
to which we are so attached. 
The risk, in other words, is of recreating a very substantial divide within the retired population: on 
the one hand, those who have been able to acquire solid supplementary personal pensions or have . 
do~e  so through enterprises or  professional associations and, on the other hand, those who will have 
to make do with a basic pension based on 1n •old-age minimum· which is increasingly remote from 
the average levels of workers' pay. 
Some economists have argued that this debate is wide of the mark for another reason: the idea th1t 
the use of capitalisation makes it possible to offset the •lack.. of young people• due to ageing.  From 
a macro-economic point of view, the financial 11ving offered by capitalisation has 1 basic coro1J1ry: 
over time, when the generations of workers who have made capital savings enter retirement, they 
need to realise the assets which they have accumulated.  The only people to whom they can go for 
this purpose is the group of people who treatill working, i.e. the younger gener~tlons. Market 11w1 
mean that the demand from younger generations, fewer in number, for these assets capitalised by 
their elders may be smaller and may lead to depreciation.  Capitalisation does not therefore resolve 
the demographic imbalance, as it is impossible, from the point of view of the global economy, to 
store up purchasing power. 
• 2 •  Social expenditure on the elderly 
Have elderly people become the main beneficiaries of public social expenditure under redistribution 
mechanisms, in particular pensions and health care 1 The proportion of social expenditure for which 
they account is undoubtedly much greater than their demographic size (between 35 and 45%), but 
this age-group is also the most delicate and the most threatened.  The proportion allocated to adults 
(15-641 is also far from negligible and may be as much as  50% (as in Italy). 
Social  protection  expenditure  accounts  for a 
very substantial proportion of European States' 
budgets.  This heading includes various types of 
protection, such as protection against sickness 
and  disability or old-age  which are by far the 
most important items, but also unemployment 
insurance,  family  allowances  and  maternity 
benefits  and  housing benefit.  In  1992, each 
European  citizen  received  ·on  average  the 
equivalent  of  ECU  4348  although  the 
differences  between  countries  are  in  some 
cases, in absolute terms, approximately 1 to 4. 
Eight  Member States  are  in almost .  complete 
alignment along an  up~ard straight line which 
clearly shows that socialprotectioll expe.nditure ·  .. 
Increases  when  GOP  per  Inhabitant  also · 
increases.  Five  Member States INL,  OK,  F,  B _  . 
and  UKJ  which have  more or less  the  same 
standard  of  living  have  very  different 
expenditure levels, with the Netherlands at the 
top  and  the  United  Kingdom  at the  bottom, 
which also bears out the idea that it is possible 
tq increase the proportion of social -xpenditure 
without automatically endangering the economic 
equilibrium. 
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GOP,.,  hoM Cln PPS) In the Union, the two main functions of •old age• and •health• account alone for 80% of social 
protection expenditure.  family allowances and even unemployment allowances come well behind 
old age and health, representing six times lesa in percentage terms. 
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The growth of  the social protection/GOP ratio slowed down considerably during the 1980s after the 
rapid increase of the 1970s.  In some European countries the trend seems for some years to have 
been towards stabilisation (Belgium,  Denmark)  or towards a reduction (Germany).  Nevertheless, 
there are still substantial differencea between Member States because those States in which social 
protection was less developed have started to catch up (Spain, Greece. Italy. Portugal) with respect 
to those where major progress had already been made (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark). 
A final question needs to be raised.  Is the increasing proportion of elderly people likely to generate 
an increase in health costs?  Although studies have demonstrated that the consumption of health 
care actually increases with age,  there is not enough data at present to measure the impact of 
ageing on health costs with any accuracy.  The information available is not broken down by the age 
of beneficiaries and shows only overall costs.  Health expenditure, moreover, depends on  State 
regulations that define beneficiaries, on the types of benefits financed and on the amounts of these 
benefits. A decrease or an increase in health expenditure is more likely to be caused by these factors 
than by demographic development per se. 
It  may be wondered. however. whether demographic development will rapidly lead to a demand for 
new social protection services.  The ageing of age structures goes together with changes in family 
models and  increasing numbers of working women.  The traditional suppliers of care  within the 
family then become less available. 
2.3.4  Economic and social situation of pensioners 
- 1 - Standards of living an_d  sources of income 
Wages and pay account for only a smaJI ~roportion  Qf the total.  resources of elderly people (between 
5 and  201)(,).  Old-age  pensiOns  and  oiher retirement benefiti, whether pubtic,  professional or 
private, are the most substantial source of income and range from 70% to 95% or more in different 
Member States.  - -
In the Union as a wJ:tQie.  the mean retirement pension represents approximately 60% of the GOP 
per inhabitant and pensioners  can  expect a pension giving a net replacement  of 40 to 1  00% 
(depending on the country) of the average salary of an employee. 
These figures mask, however, major disparities. not only between countries, but within the same 
Member State between different social categories.  It should be borne in mind that it is difficult to 
37 measure this disparity with any accuracy as there is a shortage of information on this type of data. 
Taking all ages together, percentages of the poor, defined as people possessing leu than half the 
mean  income per inhabitant, vary from 7% (Belgium,  Netherlands) to more than  25% (Greece, 
Portugal), but poverty is generally more intense among the elderly than among the younger age-
groups since the situation of the very old is alao more unstable.  Victims of poverty include people 
who have  not had a  fuU  working life,  who have  not been  able  to claim  any entitlement  to a 
survivor's or reversionary pension (widows) or who do not satisfy the conditions for the allocation 
of minimum living allowances. 
Although all social security ayatema contain, to different degrees, provision• to cover atypical casta, 
levels of protection may vary substantially in different Member Stat••~ In aurveys conducted in the 
Union, only 12% of the elderly people surveyed said that they were diaaatisfild or very disaatisfted 
with their financial situation in comparison with three times as many people (36%) who cOiltidered 
their situation comfortable or very comfortable. There are substantial differences between countries. 
They range from only 2% of disutiafied people in Denmark to more than 50% in Greece.  Countries . 
with the highest levels of satisfaction are, in decreasing order: Denmark (76%), the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg (69%), the Netherlands (53%) and Italy (51%). 
• 2 •  The state of health of the elderly 
Is increasing longevity accompanied by a parallel improvement in health?  At the outaet, during the 
1970s, declining mortality rates went together with an increase in minor disabilities.  Since the mid-
1980s, however,  this pattern seems  to have been  reversed,  with an. apparent decline in health 
problems.  In other words, life without disability seems to increase at the same rata as life itself. 
When the over-60s are questioned, moreover, two thirds say that they are •in good health• in the 
sense that they are not suffering from any disorder which limits their activity - the percentage being 
slightly higher for men than for women.  The percentage drops with age but, nevertheless, over half 
of octogenarians and above do not seem to have any restrictions on  what they do. 
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Men  Women This percentage varies substantially among the Member States.  It is only 46% in Greece, whereas 
it is  above 75% in Belgium.  Without supplementary information,  it is undoubtedly difficult to 
interpret these differences validly.  They raise Questions, however, in particular when it is borne in 
mind that functional independence, or at least its perception, is a basic criterion in characterising 
the living conditions of elderly people. 
2.3.5  The social end economic usefulness of the elderfy 
Western societies are going through a spectacular change in the area of service_ production, which 
is no longer in competition with. but supplements and even  stimulates the production of goods. 
Services are now an integral part of production and make use, both upstream and downstream, of 
high-technology goods with a high added value.  They therefore have substantial spin-off effects 
on the economy as a whole.  ·  '  _,  ·- .-;  ·  ·  ..  ,..........  · · ··-··  ... ·  ... ··  · 
The  elderly and the demand  from elderly people,  especially the  •new old., are  one of the  main 
potential. markets for many of these activities.  This can already be seen in the area of health and 
leisure, although it is slightly less true at present in the ·area of education.  - . 
In Europe, the senior citizens' market already contains over 1  00 million people, who have high levels  · 
of purchasing power because of the Quality· of European social protection schemes.  · -
The demand from new consumers will completely reshape Western economies in a growing number 
of sectors.  In so doing, new jobs will be created in these cultural industries and services which may 
offset, partially or totally, losses in traditional sectors and in particular in those industrial activities 
most threatened by robotics. 
Lastly, elderly people, because they have an unrivalled health capital and life span, piav an essential 
role in the informal economy as a result of the services that they transfer to the other generations. 
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Key points for further consideration 
1  .  Analysis of trends in age structures in the Union undoubtedly requires an examination of 
two dimensions at the same time.  A  basic dimension,  which consists in  studying the 
ageing  process  as  part  of  a  developing  societal  system,· and  another  shorter-term 
dimension  attempting to measure  the effects of this ageing  on today's economic and 
social organisation. 
2.  As a process, the ageing of population structures in the European Union is inevitable. 
This is a normal stage of human development which is due to major advances and·the 
extension of life and its quality, and  which is leading towards a stationary demographic 
situation.  The  developing  countries  are  at  present  in  the  midst  of  a  demographic 
transition  or  are  likely  to  be  so  soon,  thereby  triggering  the  process  of  ageing. 
Attempting to reverse this trend is not just illusory but sert.'es no purpose either. 
3.  While our demographic structures are changing so is the world of employment.  We are 
leaving the industrial era and entering the era of technology and services.  This situation 
requires redeployment towards other types of activity, more costly in terms of research 
and development, but much less costly in terms of production.  An investment in human 
capital  today  would  perhaps  provide  the  economic  stimulus  needed  to  finance 
tomorrow's pensioners. 
4.  One way of ensuring that the elderly are genuinely integrated into our societies would be 
to abolish  certain  practices  which artificially accentuate the  ageing  of society.  These 
include the abolition of age limits (on jobs), the removal of the linear career model with 
three successive stages and the establishment of an alternation between work, training 
and leisure in the organisation of life cycles, the removal of barriers between working life 
and non- working life by abandoning fixed retirement in favou[ of  Jle~ible retirement and 
making  the  most  of human  capital  by_ ~n~ouraging pensioners  to  take  on  •second 
careers· in sectors of social utility. 
5.  Because  of the structural effect of the  •baby boom· between  1945 and  1965, ageing 
has yet to place its most substantial burdens on social protection.  The  oldest of these 
generations  will reach  retirement age  only at the  beginning of the  next century.  The 
•demographic balance• of the active population is not guaranteed anywhere.  It may well 
be  offset by the growth of women's work, but this growth will be compromised if the 
volume of jobs currently available is not sufficiently attractive. 
6.  There is no doubt that demographic analysis has some relevance in explaining the causes 
of changes  in the  balances  between  generations  and  predicting  ~heir impact.  . Oo its 
own, however, it is unable to measure the economic and social cost of the imbalances 
that it reveals.  In order to do so,  analysis has to include economic variables  (level and 
structure of income; unemployment; sectors of activity; professional cycles; and many 
others)  and in particular factors linked  to the current organisation of social protection 
(definition of beneficiaries. and  their entitlements):  this is I  question  that cannot be 
treated lightly and it is to be deplored that conclusions in this area are sometimes .drawn 
solely from estimates of demographic de_velop~ent which· are themselves hypothetical  .. 
40 CHAPTER Ill 
LESS  CONSISTENT  FAMILY  STRUCTURES 
By proclaiming  1994 as the international year of the  family, the United Natic,ns  wanted to give a 
new boost to international cooperation intended to promote this basic entity of society.  The mono 
•euilding the  smallest democracy within  society•  stressed the  essential aspects  of this event's 
message: the respect of individual rights and freedoms, equality of the sexes and solidarity within 
the family.  The  role of the family as  a pivot between the individual and society was  vigorously 
emphasised at the recent international conference on population and development in Cairo.  Those 
decisions which, when added together, fashion the overall structures of the population are made 
in this private and closely-knit space, in this •pivot• micro~roup  formed by the family.  The family 
therefore seems to be the key protagonist in future vends in demograohic evolution, and it is for 
this very reason that it is studied here. 
In turn,  however,  the  economic  and  social  organisation  of States  has  an  impact  on  families. 
Policies  on  housing,  socic.l  law,  labour  organisation,  the  dates  of .school  holidays  and  social 
protection systems are all fields in which decisions aHect  families.  It is not therefore possible to 
djsregard  the  fact that the  family  is  part  and  parcel  of all  social  and  economic  changes;  the 
relationship between these diHerent developments needs to be stressed.  This is particularly true 
of the position that the family occupies in the informal economy through its function as a network 
of solidarity and through the transmission of wealth, property and services. 
3.1  The household- a space for the family 
The solidarity of the nuclear family is reflected by its shared life, accommodation and income.  It 
is for this rea·son that it corresponds in most cases to a household, which can  then  be seen as its 
morphological  expression.  Households  do  occasionally  include  members  who  are  unrelated, 
although the  counterpart to this is that some  people nowadays live outside of any family.  The 
household is therefore a broader concept than the family.  The immediate focus of demographers 
when  collecting  data,  moreover,  is  the  hpusehold  in  the  first  instance  and  not  the  family. 
Households consequently have to be taken  into account,  bearing in  mind that by far the  largest 
number of households consists of one family and that the inclusion of members outside the ·close• 
family is much tess common. 
3.1.  1  The  main categories of households 
Tho  main  distinction between  households  is  between  households  with  family  and  households 
without family.  Households with family are themselves divided into three main categories: couples 
with children, childless couples and single parents with children.  Households without family include 
single-person households and those of several people not related by family ties. 
- 1 - Childleu family households account tor one fifth of family households 
.  . 
Statistics on childless family households are difficult to interpret as they cover three groups whose 
numbers may not all have changed in the same way in diHerent Member States:  households of 
former parents, households of •parents·to·be• and those of partners who have never had children. 
Overall,  these  households account for a relatively consistent percentage  of around  20%.  Their 
components are undoubtedly weighted, however, in very different ways: increasing life span af1e; 
the depanure of the first child, increased  age  when the filst child Is born and also, IS in certain 
countries such as Germany. Increasing numbera of courles permanently without child~en.  These 
percentages are also influenced by the age structure of the population. 
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18,1  17,7  61.1  10,1  :  12,0  70,2  72.3  74,11'  :  IQ.&  a.3  71,1  .... 
:  2.2,1  :  23,3  23,7  17,1  24,1  13,7  11.4  21.2  22.6  22.2  27,4 
:13,51  21,9  26,6  23,1  20,2  16,1  23,7  12.2  17,8  11,6  22.2  zo.o  26,2 
:  0,1  :  0,2  3,6  1,8  1,3  1,5  1,5  1,6  0,3  2.2  1,1 
I 
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:  1,4  :  0,3  7.3  6,2  1,7  6,0  3,7  3,8  0,5  6,0  1,4 
:  9,2  :  6,3  6.0  8,2  7.2  10,6  8,5  7,1  6.3  6,8  9,0 
:  1.8  :  1,2  1.2  1,1  1,0  1,8  2.0  1,6  1,5  0.9  1.3 
2.6  1.2  0.9  0,9  0.9  1,0  1,0  1.5  1,2  1,0  o.a  0.8  1,1 
:  0,6:  0,3  0.3  0,2  0,1  0,3  0,9  0,6  0,6  0,2  0,1 
:  7,3  :  5,1  4.8  7,1  6.1  8.8  6,5  6,4  4,8  5,9  7,8 
1.4  6,2  4,9  4,6  4.1  5,9  5.7  7,3  5,7  4,9  4,2  4,8  7.1 
:  1,1  :  0.6  0,7  1,2  0,4  1.5  0.8  1,4  0,8  1,1  0,7 
0,0 
1.6  0,8  UJ  z.z  :  1,1  0,6  0,7  1,7  1,6  o.o  3,9  0.9 
2.s>C  ··~  31;4.  38,2.  37:7  21.2  16,9  . 29:z: 
.,-,-·.,•·:-nr.'l"M'I}~ft~~ 7-·•·7  ,.  , ,, .. ·-• r. ··~--
. ;··::..:·.2.?,1J: ·! •"  ~.  ·-.•  ~  ..  :~=!'·  :~:  ··_  · ..  3'J,.  · ·  ·1e.3·  .-; ··.  9,5  . 
21.1  28,4  34.4.  33.6  16.3  13,4  27,1  20.2  l0,6  25,4  30.0  13.8  26,2 
9,6  11,8  14.5  12,4  5.8  3,8  10.1  9.5  6,3  10,0  12.5  4,2  10,0 
11  .•  16,6  19,.9  21,2  10.5  9,6  17.1  10.6  14,3  15.5  17.4  9,7  16,2 
3,6  3,0  3.8  4.0  4.9  3.6  2.1  6,1  3.1  5,6  7,7  2,4  3.3 • 2 •  Family households whh children • disparities among Member States 
The percentages of househOlds· made up of a couple with It least one child are higher and mort 
dlver11 than the preceding group.  They exc,ed 40% in Ireland and Ponugal, but reach only 28% 
in Denmark.  A whole range of factors has an impact on these l)lrctntagta in this cue as weD: 
percentage of childlall cou_plu, Increasing numbers of young adulta living with th~it.parentsand. 
In some e.us tht age limit from which the c:hikl, even when resident, is no longer considered to 
be  a child for statistical purposes.  Undtr thtae circumst1ncta it is  very difficwlt to draw any 
general conclusions.  It anma to be tht caae. however, that in the Union (with the exception of 
the Mediterranean Member States) tht percentlgea show 1 awing away from t'louseholds of two 
parents with children towards single-parent households in particular. 
• 3 •  Single-parent families • mothers are reaponaibfe in 85% of caMs 
There has undoubtedly been a clear increase in the numbers of aingle·ptrent households. 
Table 18 
Peroentqe of ........  ,.,.,., famlld 
with et IMat on• chid qed under 11 c•t 
1911/12  1110111._ 
lelglum  ••• 
Denmark  11,1 
Genneny  1,1 
GrHCe 
Spm  6,4 
F,..,.ce·  ·  1,3 
Ireland  7,2 
ICely  7,3 
Luxembourg  I,  1 
Nedleftand•  7,8 
Portug  .. 
United Klntdom  13.7 
EUR 1Z 
t•J ..,. .t  •ul  ,_,...  whit er leur-clllfitl eg«tflltftl r  I 
s-u:lvtNr.r 
14,1 
20,4 
115,4 
15,7 
e.o 
tO,I 
10,7 
12,3 
12,1 
1,0 
11,0 
The percentage of this ty~  of hOf.1$8hold w.here the mot~er  raas,$~lt  .rtSJK.)nl!bi!ity~  il.~%  in all the 
Member States. This per~en~ga haa oot decreased for thiny years..  YJhether .the division of the 
•burden• of child~en ia decid8d by the courts or by· agreement between  ..  ~he parents, this figure 
remains unchanged.  lt.ls evident.  oft the other handdhat ~ttt.rs, in this tv-" Qf  family, ,,. 
increasingly Ius likely ~o be aingle or w!dowed •nd jncr111in8fy !:ft9r~IUcaly ~  ~  di~.  . 
.,·  .  . .  ·=·.  '. 
Spiralling divorce rates  e~ptain. the substantial increase in this type-of household since t980. 
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Do we IIHd to /oolt •t  r«:DMtltutH housMio/dl1  HMd/y MY tWH•ble Slit/sties Ire IVIi,.~  ftN these . 
howelto/tn.  EvMUitloM .,..  poasi/JM only on the IMsls of  reti'O$I»Ctive ..ayeys.  Estim,tes of tM/r 
proptNt/on of  111 househD/ds hive PfOV!Wd,fii/CKeS of-'"  In FIWI'ICe,  8"  In the United K/ngd(Jm Md  7" In Dettmlfi.  Even thoug/1 the tem.m.ge  T~te his f1/len, it Is thei{Jinlllng dNorce me thlt h•s 
m•de this f.,lly model motW common. 
·':"·-:··  ·.·-· 
• 4 •  Subst.ntial growth In slngle·person households 
The family is traditionally the core of- the household.  In the pist it was inconceivable for sorrtoone, 
whether single or widowed, to live on their own permanently.  · .- ·  -.  __  ..  __ 
Teblo 17 
TreMl In elntle~IWOII housoflolclo olnce  tHO ,,., 
1110  1110  1171  1111  ,.., 
Nine tenths of households without family are 
those formed by a alngle person.  Other types 
are not generally studied in any great detail. 
The proportion of  single-person households with 
respect  to  all  households  has  continued  to 
grow. 
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This type of household was exceptional for a long time.  It was inconceivable to live outside the 
family.  Nowadays, in many Member States, the percentage is close on or over 30%.  This increase 
Is  due  to a  whole range  of factors  which  are  difficult to analyse  if the  very heterogeneous 
aggregate that this type of family forms is taken as a starting point.  It includes single people living 
alone,  divorcees, married people awaiting divorce or simply separated,  elderly widowers and in 
particullf elderly widows.  Any analysis  of these  factors  has  therefore  to  be  preceded  by a 
breakdown of the people making up these households by sex, marital status and broad age-groups. 
These data are available and it is to be hoped that they can be  processed and published for the 
Union as a whole. 
The  increase  In  the numbJr of single-person households  augments  ca~es of single  !ife.  This 
quantitative observation hll a pejorative connotation.  It concerns women in particular, bearing in  . 
mind that larger numbers of women remain permanently single than men, the remarriage rate is 
lower for women and, in  p~rticular, their life expectancy is longer.  These considerations should 
not mask the fact that .some people choose the single life and that living alone does not mean living 
outside a  network of relationships.  A  new, but inevitable,  factor Is  that cenaln single-person 
households represent situations, of differing length, of transition between two family householdi 
or betwun two consensual unions, whereas others are permanent.  This period of transition and 
permanent  single  life have  nothing In  common  apart from the  morphological  structure  of the 
moment. 
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28 3.1.2  Household size 
Recent trenda, espec  ..  lly the proliferation of  single-person households and the drop in the birth rate, 
are causing demographic composition to become leas consistent.  One- or two-person houaehokfa 
account  for half  of all  households  and  in  certain  cities  single-person  houaehofda  reach  this 
percentage  on  their  own.  Households  of five  or  more  people  account  for only  13%  of all 
houHholdl. 
This  overall  breakdown  undoubtedly  masks 
dlaparatelltuationl in different Member Statu. 
The  1verage  size  of  households  Ia 
1pproxlmatetv  three  people  In  the 
Medlterr1nun Member Statel and lrel1nd, but 
Is  no more than  2. 1 people  in Germany  and 
Denmark.  The most atrildng trend, perhtps, is 
the downtUrn In  the tvPI of household which 
was  most  widespread  for  many  veers: 
households made up of two married people and 
at least one child.  Even  when households of 
unmarried  parentl are  included,  the figure  is 
never more than 50% of the total and is often 
around 35%. 
This  situation  reflecta  major  changea  in 
behaviour accompanied,  in some casea,  by a 
certain ·  haziness  of  the  concept  of  the 
household which has up to now been relatively 
clear. 
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This Is true, for instance, of some reconstituted households where the children live part of the time 
with one parent and part with the other; at the time of formation of some couples; in cases, albeit 
rare,  of married people who each  have a home but are not actually  •separated•  and are  often 
known 11 "LATa" (living Apart Together).  Theae changing altuationa make  atatlatlciana'  taaka 
more diffi~ult. 
3.2  Family biographies 
The structure of households, at a given moment, is a anapahot of the many events causing new 
households to be  formed,  modified or broken  up.  The  different histories of then hounholds 
therefore have to be analysed if we are genuinely to understand this overall structure. 
3.2.  1  More complex famly patterns 
. In societies where the extended family formed the_family unit, this family was constantly renewed. 
The  same. wal true of the patriarchal family.  People left •home• and  were replaced  by others 
tttrough marriage and birth.  There was continuity.  This history has now become more complex, 
marking a definite break with the past as the same is not now true of the conjugal household.  A 
family is crtlted by the union of two partners: it develops through the birth of children, who grow 
up and leave the household.  One of the partners dies.  With the death of the other partner, the 
family hlstorv comes to an  end.  This outline Is the simplest and,  for the most part, the most 
common. 
45 Divorce and separation break up the initial family, however, and often lead to reconstituted families. 
If the beginning of the consensual union and not marriage is taken as the family's starting point, 
c.,,, of these episodic histories mushroom. 
looking now from the point of view of Individuals,· it can be Men that family histories can take a . 
whole range of directioni.  The diagram of family routes shows that, following depanure from the 
parental home, people take a wide variety of routes of differing complexity.  The central route is 
the slmpleat: It reflects a single choice binding the Individual from marriage to death. 
It can also be seen that men's or women's lives 
may  be  made  up  of  a  number  of  family· 
sequences, in most cases separated by  differing 
periods of  single life.  This discontinuity is then, 
in moat cases,, the result of a decision by one of 
the panners.  In this case, the story becomes a 
sequence  of episodes  with a large number of 
protagonists  linked  only  by  their  common 
children.  The time of the break-up, the length 
of the union and the extent of the·solidarity ties 
that  have  been  broken  give  the  break-up 
different meanings.  The separation of a young 
childless  couple,  whose shared  life  has  been 
shon, cannot be  viewed  in the  same  way as 
divorce in a family with children whose union 
has lasted several years. 
3.2.2  Signa of the  bre~kdown of famUy  biographies 
I 
I 
- 1 - Cohabitation outside marriage, frequent In the North, but still minimal In the South 
At the beginning of family life there  is now, in some countries at least, a relatively long period 
during which young men and women live together without marriage.  Measuring this phenomenon 
is  no easy  task,  and  estimates  from  censuses  and  through household  analysis  enable  only an 
imprecise evaluation.  They do however provide an order of magnitude. 
Table  18 
CoMerwu81 unlone •  per~nt1ge of el unlone, 
~rounlt 1 .a.  In 1 eelectlon of Europ ..  n  countrle1 
Age  D (FGRI  F  I  NL  UK  s  FIN  N  A  H 
-- -·  . -
11·11  30,0  35,1  4,2  83,0  50,4  . 82,7-.  41,7  75,0  ..  45,4- ..  .1.2· 
20.24  14,0  2,1  38,3  21,0  . 77,1  ...  -47,0  -~~- 11.-7  &,3 
21·21  8,2  10,1  1,1  15,1  12,1  41,1  23,1  23,0  ···1,1  2,4 
30-34  1,0  1,1  1,7  1.1 
.. 
21.1  11,1  3,1  12,0  2,7 
31-D  2,0  !5,5  1,1  4,0  4,3  11.2  7,1  7,0  3,2  2,1 
4o-44  1,1  2,2  '3,7  13,0 
- . 
2,t  ~:. -- 2~1 
41-41  2,0  1,0  2,1  2.1  10,2  3,7  3,0  2,1  3,1 
10.14  1,0  1,8  1,1  "1,7  ..  - -·  2,0--- - 2.7  .. 
1&-11  1,1  1,1  2,3  0,1  5,1  3,7  3,0  1,5  2.7 
80-84  1,4  1,1  1,2  4.7  2.2  3,0 
.. 
Tot81  4,7  8,8  1,4  7,7  1,2  11,1  11,4  10,1  4,2  .  -2,1 
···-
46 Since 1985, percentages have increased substantially, although the Member States have retained 
more or less the same rankings.  Three different levels of living together by young people can be 
seen.  It is clearly evident that this iituation accounts for half or more of unions between people 
aged between  20 and  24 in the Scandinavian countries.  The example of Italy is,  nevertheleas, 
significant: even if under-declaration• are taken into account, this model has not really gained a 
foothold among Mediterranean population•.  Between these two extremes there are varying, but 
relatively substantial, frequencies among the remaining European countries. 
This photograph does not, however, give an exact picture of the extent of this phenomenon.  Some 
of the situations of cohabitation observed on a given date will lead rapidly to marriage, others to 
marriage at a later stage and others will not end in marriage at all.  The real ixtent of the •pre-
marital cohabitation• model can b8 pinpointed only if it is possible to answer the question: •What 
proportion of marriages  have  been  preceded  by living together on a  permanent basis? • · The 
answer, in this case as well, is very difficult and can be provided only by specific surveys.  Some 
information is available, however, for some countries. 
This table does not show the percentage of people living together Who· go on to become married, 
but the  percentage,  among  a number of marriages,  of those preceded  by living together.  At 
present less than 1  0% of marrJages now take place immediately in Sweden.  The percentage for 
France is no more than 30%.  This means that these data are largely out of date: there has been 
a rapid  increase  over the  ~ast 10 years.  This  table is interesting,  however,  as  it highlights the 
increase in Denmark, which is fairly representative of the Scandinavian countries, and the absence 
of the Mediterranean countries where _the  trend was still of little significance around  1980. 
It is obviously impossible to predict the proponion of people currently living together who will get 
married.  The  percentages of those  •already married• by the age  of 35 among generations for 
whom living together has been a common practice show that this is for the most pan a premarital 
lifestyle.  In Denmark and Sweden, for instance, some 70% of the 1955 generation of women were 
married by the age of 35. 
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Hwrwf C.,-.t  ... ·-el  XX/-111 CM""Y. ,.,.,_ ,,., • 2.  Marriage rates: marriage Is postponed everywhere. but more in the North than the South 
living together can be reconciled with a marriage rate which continues to account for the majority 
only if age at the time of marriage increases. 
T.tlle 20 
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1110  24,0  22,1  22,1  23,4  21,2  21,1- 23,0  27.1  24,8  :  24,2  24,8  23,3 
\170  2.1.1  22,4  22,1  22,1  23,7  24,7  22,1  21,3  23,1  :  22,1  24,3  : 
1110  23.2  22,2  24,1  22,1  23,1  23,5  23,0  25,0  23,8  23,0  ~3.1  23,2  23,0 
1110  21.1  24,2  27,1  21,3  24,1  21,3  25,15  21,1  25,1  25,4  25,1  24,8  : 
1112  21.4•  24,7  21,0  25,8  25,0  215,8(1)  28,1  21,1  25,7(11  28,0  28,5  24,3  25,!5111  ..  Ill:,., 
This age decreased generally between 1960 and 1980 and has increased over the last ten years. 
It Is very significant that Denmark. as  well as  Sweden, are exceptions.  In practice, the general 
trend towards a decrease-in a-ge·at the time of marriage was affecting'ail tt'ii' Member States in the 
1960s and 1970s.  The reversal of the trend started in the Nonh while age at the time of marriage 
was continwng to fall in the South, especially in Spain.  The reversal of the trend that is affecting 
all the Member States of the Union is therefore the same, but with a substantial timelag between 
the Nonh and the South.  This is concealed by the overall trends in average ages at the time of first 
marriage for the Union as a whole. 
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All these changes  have ultimately had  only a relatively small impact on  the number of couples 
sharing their lives: people living together have cancelled out the deficit of non-marriages and the 
reduction  in  the  number  of  married  people  between  the  ages  of  20  and  40  is  almo!l-
counterbalanced by the number of consensual unions. It  is not, therefore, falling numbers of people 
living together that provide an explanation for the fall in fenility. 
· 3 ·  Majority-age children living with their parents 
Another major change has taken place in the family life cycle: children continue to live with their 
parents for much longer periods after reaching the age of majority.  In the  t 950s,  young men 
generally left the parental home after their military service and young women after 1heir marriage; -
48 this took place in most cases around the ages of 21-2  2, at least in the Nonhern and Central areas 
of the Union.  The current situation is quite different in many Member States. 
Several surveys have shown, for instance, that young women continue to leave the parental home 
earlier than their brothers.  They are now older, however, than they_were 25 years ago.  The most 
rapid change has taken place over the last ten years.  Two consecutive factors explain this change: 
in the first instance, parents wanted to make the most of this period of economic prosperity to give 
their children good vocational qualifications.  Between 1960 and  1980, the numbers of men and 
women students continued to grow throughout the Union.  The rates differed in different Member 
States but were high everywhere. 
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For the last ten years, unemployment among young people has extended the period during which 
majority-age children continue to live with their parents almost everywhere.  The lack of a job not 
only encourages them to look for higher qualifications at university but also deprives them of their 
own resources. 
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As can  be seen,  these levels vary greatly from one Member State to another and  it. seems  likely 
that the frequency of living with parents is linked to these levels.  In many Member States, over 
50% of young men, if not young women, In this age-group remain at home.  This is a new situation 
for the family.  It undoubtedly has advantages for both generations, since parents are in most cases 
happy to keep  in daily contact with their children and children gain the security that their social 
integration  has  not yet  given  them  from  this  extension  of life  in the  parental  home.  These 
advantages are not without drawbacks, however.  This leads to an  ambiguous situation.  Is this 
extended hospitality part of parents' normal  obligations or is  it a generous contribution on their 
part?  Is it possible for children to be both dependent and adult?  These ambivalences lead in some 
cases to situations where the parents find it hard not to feel exploited in some way or another and 
the  young  people  consider the  hospit.a!itv  thit they receive  as  an  inevitable,  bu(_overly ~g. 
constraint.  ·  · 
- 4 •  A new stage between retirement and genuine old  ""~!! 
A pensioner who stops work at the age of sixty can now expect a funher twenty or so years of 
life.  At the  same  age,  a woman can  expect  twenty-five.  During  part of this time,  there  will 
undoubtedly be a loss of autonomy, whose extent and length may differ.  It seems, however, that 
the expectation of life without any disability is increasing at the same rate as life expectancy itself. 
Under these circumstances, it  is the proportion of •aten• retirement which is continuing to increase. 
The length of this period is likely to vary substantially depending on the individual, but it would not 
be unreasonable for men to count on fifteen years and women on at least twenty. 
49 Two •active• generations therefore coexist; the first is submerged, however, by its tasks,  while 
the second has a substantial capital of leisure time.  It is possible,  therefore,  for these  •young• 
retired parents and their 30 to 40-year·old children to complement one another, as the former can 
make the aubatantial amount of time that they have available to the latter.  This symbiosis often 
starts before retirement.  The •pivotal• generations, made up for the most part of women, are likely 
to  be  around  50  years  old  and  are  likely  to  have  intense  contacts  with  their  children  and 
grandchildren, as a survey of this issue hn  shown. 
Demographic developme'lt has therefore laid the foundations for the family to take its share of the 
securities which are still assumed in most cues by society.  The economic rec~ssion and the job 
crisis have meant that instrumental values are regaining a strong foothold In the family.  For young 
unemployed people, handicapped parents, discouraged teenagers, the family appears to be the only 
safe haven.  Will this rediacov.ered fu[)ction of unconditional solidarity not provide the family with 
new vigour7  There Ia  no certain  answer.  Recent  atudiel show_  th~  ·the precarious  nature of 
employment has an impact Q~  the stability _of marriage.  Marriages find it ~ard to withs,and long· 
term  unemployment.  The  malaise  of our time  does  not therefore  always  lead  to closer  links 
between generations or between partners.  It may also generate, Jf the  family remains  without 
support, a permanent divid~ between integrated citizens and the margin411iSed .. 
Key 1o inteiJitWiatiotL· 516~ olthe ·pii)Ol. 
geMration prouidc tlwir  child~Wn with CJI 
least once scn~icc and  89~  prouidc tlwir 
parents with at least one  scn~ice. 17tac 
lfpra  are obtained by cornbini"' 1M 
replia obtaiMd from each of  the 
generatiotu. Gilts of  money tn  restn'clltd 
to teBulororoccasionallinancial help: 
they do not include lefJOa'U and bequatJ or 
help in fumishU., occonunodatiotL 
The oucraU financial flow is tlw~Wiore 
paler  than this pph  sho&UI. 
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GIFTS OF 
MONEY • 5 •  Breakdowns end reconstitutions of unions 
In most Membei States the divorce rate was similar in  1960 to the rate 40 years previously with 
an approximate average of 10 divorces for 100 marriages.  Nowadays, again with the exception 
of the South, numbefl of divorces have increased two, three or even more times.  In Scandinavia, 
divorce affects one out of two marriages.  The break-up of a marriage has therefore become an 
everyday event.  Thls development can be explained,  as  we will see  below, not by short-term 
reasons tending to multiply the causes of divorce, but because the marriage pact now includes a 
• de-marriage•  clause  for caaes  in  which  the  panners  feel  that their expectations  have  been 
seriously compromised.  The environment of marriage  has not become less favourable,  but the 
model of marriage Itself has been transformed.  The meaning of divorce has therefore changed and 
any comparisons between the situation now and in  1965 ·have to be carried out with great care. 
The graph illustrating the divorce rate in the European Union shows the existence of a North-South 
divide. 
To provide a complete picture, break-ups of consensual unions have to be taken into account.  Few 
data are available In this case.  Data that have been collected in some European countries show 
that these  unions have  continued  to become  more  unstable  over the  last  15 years.  When  a 
marriage takes place, it is fairly common for each panner to have lived with one or several partner• 
beforehand. 
In overall terms, except in the Southern Member States, a substantial proportion of the population 
will enter into several unions, in most cases under different types of marital status. 
Map 4 • Current divorce rate for 1  00 marriages In  1990 
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Household analysis led to the conclusion of fragmentation.  It is now clearer that this fragmentation 
is partly due to the discontinuity of family histories.  The  last two centuries have  seen  a move 
away from complex extended households to simple closely-knit households.  Relatively short, but 
generally simple, family histories have been replaced by histories that are longer, but much more 
fragmented.  In no way can ~hese be seen as small changes.  They reflect genuine, rapid and clear-
cut changes in our family patterns. 
51 3.3  The issues raised by changing families 
All the morphological changes  which have been described above require explanation if we are to 
estimate their Inertia and evaluate their possible duration.  Their relatively simultaneous occurrence 
suggests that a single, but central, change has led, in the space of a few years, to these different 
developments.  Both conventional anthropology and sociology have developed their nature, and it 
seems useful to examine them here in orde~ bener to understand the demographic consequences 
of family change. 
3.3.1  The new famly model of our time: the "family-as-a-pact" 
Since the  1960s the old institutional model of the family has disintegrated and been replaced by 
a new model based on oru~er  autonomy  •.  Under the old system, pJrtnera·chose one another freely,  _ 
but their new status entailed a certain number of obligations laid down by society, especially the 
hierarchy of the sexes and the generation•.  These two fundamental precepts of differentiation, sex 
and generation, seemed in the 1960s to be out of kilter with equality perceived as the cornerstone 
of modernity and democracy.  At the same ·time;  economic prosperity and  advances in science _ 
made people feel that the time had come to take down the barriers so that everyone could forge 
their own identities. 
Legislation very quickly endorsed the  idea of the equality of the sexes  and  the freedom to break 
up marriages by mutual consent.  Private life was then regulated by the agreement of two parties 
with equal rights.  Statisticians monitored this trend and relatively quickly abandoned the concept 
of •head of household•.  In principle, marriage stopped being an institution and became a pact. 
This pact is based in the first instance on the clear perception of a kind of passport to happiness: 
this is what is known as love.  This is, in any case,  the prerequisite stated by respondents to a 
Eurobarometer survey of the perception of the family by Europeans:  to get married, the partners 
need to respect one another, then love one  another intensely, they say in proportions of 87 and 
78% respectively.  Consequently,  in comparison with the 1950s' model,  contemporary couples 
seem  to  have  retained  the  same  central  objective  of_ happiness  but  now  consider  the  old 
institutional  strategies  to  be  alien,ating.  The  whole  system  has  moved· away  from  external 
regulation  towards  re6ulation  whieh  is  seen  as  autonomous.  The  results  of this  change  are 
obviously substantial, both for partners and for their children, and are reflected by completely new 
demographic  behaviour  such  as  the  family  breakdowns  and  reconstitutions  already  discussed 
above. 
3.3.2  Socio-demographlc consequences of family change 
• 1 •  The entry of women into working life 
It was not enough for women to obtain equality in principle.  They needed their own resources if 
they were to achieve actual equality.  Massive numbers of women therefore entered the working 
world from  1970 onwards. 
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52 In  many  Member States,  the  proponion of working  women  has  doubled over  30 years.  This 
increase is even  more  spectacular when it is borne in mind  that it relates  to only one  group of 
women,  since levels have dropped sharply in the  15·24 age-group because  of longer periods of 
education.  Moreover, women aged over 45 have  not been  affected to any great extent by this 
change.  The Increase in the average is therefore due for the most pan to women aged between 
25 and 44 and, among them, to mothers of families in panicular, most of whom had tended not 
to work between these ages. 
The Irish situation shows that working women are in most cases single women and women without 
children.  levels in Denmark are fairly close to those for men.  lifestyles, timetables and space for 
family life are oblliously very different in theae two extreme cases.  Paradoxically, however, the 
binh rate  is  very  similar.  While  mothers of one  or two children  almost all  work in  Denmark, 
however, ·the same  is not true of those with three children.  There  is 1  st)arp fall in the rate  for 
these women." as in other Union Member States.  ·  ,. '  - -
Full-time work is not the only factor in this increase in women's work.  Between  1983 and  1989, 
the spread of part-time work was by far the most decisive factor in this increase in a number of 
Member States. 
This  type  of  work  has  therefore  grown  in 
popularity over the last 20 years: it represents 
a third way of life  and  a kind of compromise 
allowing  women  to  retain  ·their  financial 
independence, but not their capacity to forge a 
real  career  and  also  makes  it  possible  for 
women  to stay  with  their children  for longer 
periods. 
Opinion  surveys  showed,  some  twenty-five 
years  ago,  that  women  preferred  this 
compromise.  The  formula which is nowadays 
preferred is that of full-time work as it is most 
in keeping  with the  egalitarian  ideal.  It might 
have  been  thought that the current economic 
recession  would  lead,  as  in  the  1  930s 
recession,  to an  outflow of women  from  the 
labour  market.  This  has  not been  the  case. 
Wives feel that their jobs are safeguards against 
their  husband's  unemployment  or  divorce. 
Over  and  above  this  material  advantage, 
women still want, despite the problems which 
it raises,  to ensure their independence through 
their work. 
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This has had a major impact on trends in the active population.  During the last five_ years, it is 
largely the  growing  number  of working  women  which  has  shaped  the  increase  in  the  active 
population.  Eurostat estimates, moreover, that in five years' time between 50 and 60% of this 
Increase will be due to women.: This increased panicipation by women in the labour force will play _ 
a significant pan in counterbalancing the number of non-workers generated by the ageing process. 
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Graph 24 - Activity rates by age, in 1992 
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Graph 24 (end) - Activity rates by age. in 1992 
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...  .  ,. - 2 - Decreasing fertility 
The  most  widespread  of all  the  demographic  changes  observed  over  the  last  30  years  is 
undoubtedly the drop in fertility. It has affected all the Union Member States to differing extents 
at different times. 
Fertility is measured  by two cunventional  indicators:  the  total fertility rate  and  the completed 
fertility of generations.  The former is much more sensitive, but of less importance as it refers to 
a single year,  although it can obviously be monitored over time.  The second brings together the 
children of women of a given generation: it is available only when these women have reached the 
end of their reproductive life.  • 
There has been a spectacular fall almost everywhere in the total fertility-fate.  From a starting point 
where the generation renewal  threshold (2. 1  0  children per womanJ  was  reached  everywhere In 
Europe,  we  have moved  to a situation where only a few countries come  near to this threshold 
(Ireland  and  Scandinavian  countries).  In  some  countries  there  does  seems  to have  been  a 
temporary levelling off at between  1·. 7  ~nd  --h4~hildren per  woman.~· ·In· some regions (former 
Federal  Republic of Germany,  Northern Italy) the  rate hiS fallen  below  1.0.  In all likelihood,  a 
calendar effect will entail  a slight rise in countries where- the rate  is currently below 1.4.  The 
recent  increase  in  Scandinavian  countries  raises  problems  and  will  need  time  for  objective 
interpretation. 
In the  case  of completed  fertility the  calendar effect is cancelled out.  A  movement towards  a 
fertility rate  which is close to or slightly less than the renewal threshold can  be  seen among the 
1960 generation,  the last for which there is a satisfactory estimate.  It would, however, be  as 
naive to take this relative balance as the truth as to be alarmed by the  surpluses that some total 
fertility rates are showing.  These two indicators, whose significance differs. obviously need to be 
read together.  For the moment, completed fertility in European Member States does not seem to 
be pointing to a failure to replace the generations. If current total fertility rates continued, however, 
they would lead to a completed fertility which rapidly showed a deficit.  National officials should 
base their appraisals on this twofold observation. 
Are the spread of the contraceptive pill and the legalisation of abortion responsible alone for the 
drop in fertility?  Two demographers·,  Westoff in the United States  and  Leridon in France,  have 
shown that new contraceptive methods  were a necessary factor but do  not explain  the drop in 
fertility on their own. The drop is due to the fact that couples, now able  to exercise total control 
over their fertility. want fewer children than couples in 1960.  It is this reduction of the number of 
children that couples want. that needs to be explained.  - · 
Despite  a genuine increase  in  infertility,  surveys conducted  in  Member  States  show that most 
couples want to have at least one child.  While this may differ in different countries, it would not 
be exaggerated  to see it as an almost general desire.  In practice, most parents do not just want 
one, but two, children.  In most Member States there is some disapproval of only children.  Why, 
then, is the rejection of a third child so widespread? 
In this case  we  need  to return  to the  family plan.  The  family is a plan  for happiness,  but for 
balanced happiness.  The  ideal number of children is therefore that which is compatible with the 
quest for the other belongings that people want,  without forgetting  the  imperative  of equalitv -
which means that these objectives are as possible for the woman as for the man;· "T:he·prevailing  . 
opinion is that almost all parents' goals can be achieved with two children, but not with three. 
European Union figures show that a third child costs one out of ten women their jobs and that this 
child considerably increases  the_~inan~ial burden linked to having children. 
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On a day-to-day basis, an equal distribution of taaks is a necessary consequence of basing the 
family on  1  pact.  If equality between men and women has been  acquired in principle, actual 
practices are far from this Ideal, as functiona remain apeeialised and women beat a much heavier 
burden of domestic work than men, even when the wife has a full·tlme job.  Time-budget aurveva 
agree on this point: the~  that men devote .to domeatic work Is far.from the time spent_on it tJy 
women and the progresa which has been made doea not add up to much_..  Many people rightly 
stress  the  need  for  1  genuine  adjustment,  i.e.  a  more  equal  distribution  of taaka,  including 
education.  In this sense, endeavours to reconcHe family life and work will in the future  .affect men  . 
just 11 much as they aff~  women at present.  •  · 
• 4 •  Births outside marriage 
Now1days the union exists solely by the decision of the union: ~Couples therefore gain emotional 
and sexual solidarity In stages:. the partners. do not  .live togetM.r, then they live togeth., on a more 
or less regular basis and ·flnaUy-they move into-e-permaneot-·and dec!arld home: in an increasing 
number of cases the decision to have a child .  is· taken before marriage is on the carda.  In aome· . 
countries, binhs outside marriage, very often prem1rital,. have r.eached.stltistical.valuea that make 
them completely unexceptional. 
TaW. Zl· Uw lllrlha .UC.Wa manlat• par 100 Iva blrtha, batw.an 1HO anlll 1HZ 
..  ..  -
EUR1%  I  DK  D  GR  I  F  IRL  I  L  NL  ,. 
UK 
1810  0,6  2,1  7,1  7,1  1,2  2,3  I,  1  1,1  2,4  1,2  . 1,4  1,5  5,2 
1870  6,2  2,1  11,0  7,2  1,1  1,4  1,1  2,7  2,2  4,0  2,1  7,3  1,0 
1810  •••  4,1  33,2  11,1  1,1  3,1  11,4  S,O  4,3  1,0  4,1  1,2  11,1 
1880  11,1  11,3.  41,4  - 11,3  2,2  1,1  30,1  1.4.1  1,5  12,1  11,4  14,7  27,1 
1882  20,0  :  4f,_5.  14~1  2,1  :  33,2  11,0  ....  12,7  12,4  .  11,1  30,1 
~ .... ·..  ... ·...  '. . .  ..  ~  ,. .. ·  ..  .  .  ', - .. 
As can be  seen,  the main increase in births outside marriage has  taken  place  over the last ten 
years.  The changea consequently followed one another in a more or leas regular order: first of all 
a falling binh rate  and growing numbera of divorces:  then the spread of living together before 
marriage and finally binha outside marriage.  In this case as welt, it can be 11en that Denmark and 
in practice all the Scandinavian countries have the highest indices, while the South of Europe, apan 
from Ponugal, has lower Indices. 
The only thing that these children born outside marriage have in common with-1950.' children is 
the marital status of their .parents.  In those days,. 40 years ago,  such children  were  born to . 
mothers abandoned  by the  father. who became  mothers in ·an  atmosphere  of social  stigma. 
Nowadays, in most casu, children are born· to an established couple Who intend to get married at 
some point In the future.  Society willingly auumea that their parents win put their house in order 
in the near future.  · 
3.3.3  Development pro,pec;~s  ':"  • . i ..  ·····-
.  . 
There Is little doubt that Union Member States will have to tackle a number of similar problems in 
the  near future.  Europeans  are  increasingly  following  the  same  fashions,  buying  the  ume 
consumer products and watching the ume films. Has this •common market• bred or is it about to 
breed similar lifestyles and similar family practices? 
59 The European Observatory on National Family Policies provides very detailed information on trends 
and developments in family policy In the Union Member States.  EUROST AT collects demographic 
data.  Eurobarometer surveys make it  possible to compare opinions in Union Member States.  What 
is currently emerging from all these resources ia the diversity of Europe. 
·- -.- -· ·-:  . 
The analysea discussed above show major differences within the current situation: from Ponugal, 
where the marriage rate remaina high, to France, where, according to current indices only_ one out 
of every two men is likely to ott married; from Sweden, where the fenilitv rate is higher than two_;  -
children  per woman to Spain  where it is just over  1.2; from  Sweden  again,  where divorce  is 
affecting one out of every two ma_rriages, to Ireland, whore divorce is not legal.  [\t present Europe 
Ia  divided Into two by a very clear boundary.  In Northern Europe,  family modela where couple 
formation  and  family  practices  do not necesurily preauppon _marriage  are  widely  accepted. 
Premarital  cohabitation is  .. lhe- norm  ~:-lht  Sca~inavi"'- coun~ri~ §nd _births  outside marriage 
account for close on SO%  of all births.  -
In the Mediterranean Member States, however, cohabitation and births outside marriage are rare 
or exceptional.  From this point of view, and this is fundamental, there are two Europes.  From the 
point of view of the optional nature of marriage, it would be posaible to draw a different, and l_ess  . 
clear-cut,  boundary: in this case  between the Scandinavian  countries where cohabitation is the 
norm and intermediate countries where it is acceptable and relatively frequent.  From this point of . 
view, the European Union, with the Scandinavian countries, is not therefore a jumbled mosaic, but 
rather a curve along which the institution of marriage increases in importance from Nonh to South. 
The picture Is much less intelligible for the other demographic characteristics.  The fertility rate in 
Germany Is close to the rate In the Mediterranean countries.  Marriage in Britain, from the point of 
view of Its timetable at least,  is not very far removed from marriage in Greece.  The  situation of 
the  Scandinavian  countries  which  are  both  the  most  emancipated  and  the  most  fertile  is 
paradoxical.  Ponugal, which seems to be the most religious of the Mediterranean countries but 
has a relatively high percentage of binhs outside marriage (16%). is also paradoxical.  Spain, where 
marriage remains the norm, but where, among all the European countries, people are most in favour 
of •total sexual freedom• (•Values• Survey, 1990). is also paradoxical.  There is a clear picture of 
differences in·cohabitation, binha outside marri1gt and  divorce rates.  Practice• and opinions in 
other areas are more ~onfused.  T~is is the current situation.  Have recent changes entailed greater 
coherence or have they intensified previous disparities? 
If account  were  taken  only of the  situation  on  the  two extreme  dates,  1965 and  1994,  the 
conclusion would have to be that differences have undoubtedly become more accentuated.  While 
the present Europe of the  Twelve was far from comparable  thirty years ago, the current divide 
between the Mediterranean countries and the remainder of Europe did not exist: consensual unions 
and births outside marriage  were relatively exceptional everywhere.  Where.  in the past, similar 
colours were juxtaposed, there are now striking contrasts.  Development therefore seems to have 
moved in the direction of substantial differentiation. 
Following the developments that have taken place in the European Union over each ten-year period 
provides a very different interpretation.  A massive movement started in the North, eating away 
at the  institutions of marriage,  rendering  them  useless  in  principle  or emptying  them  of their 
traditional meaning, causing a reduction in the fertility and marriage rates and then a proliferation 
of couples living together but not married. 
There  appear to be  two, or even three,  stages in this development bearing in mind the timelag 
between the spread of consensual cohabitation and that of births outside marriage.  A single large· 
scale movement, but with major timelags from North to South, which means that the basic change 
has still only skimmed the surface of the South.  It could therefore be  argued,  without fear of 
contradiction, that current differences are no more than a moment in a history which will ultimately 
converge. 
60 The importance of economic data.  alongside social and cultural factors, needs to be stressed by 
way of conclusion to this analysis.  Successful families depend on faith, in the broad sense,  but 
also  on  resources  and  the  country's economic  system.  While  these  two dimensions are  not 
genuinely independent, it is not enough merely to mention the former.  Standards of living, labour 
organisation, social legislation, living conditions and laws on inheri1ance are all factori which have 
an impact on dally relationships and family models.  A potential rapprochement of Union Member 
States in  the  area  of demographic behaviour depends  on  the convergence  of all  these  factors. 
Similar lifestyles can be achieved only by reduCing differinces between standards of living. 
Economic constraints stratify conduct and opinions within each country.  This aJso has to be true 
of countries.  It is Impossible to dissociate the development of families in the European Union from 
the more general development of social solidarity.  In other words; these convergences  are  not 
necessarily written In  ta~lets of st~ne~  _  buf also .!fepind -on the  volitl~n_  ~f those involved~ 
61 Chapter 3 
Key points for further consideration 
1.  Over the last twenty to thirty years, relatively short, but generally simple, family histories 
have  been  replaced  by histories  that are  longer,  but" much  more  fragmented."  Family 
histories havi become complex: cohabitation and births outside marriage, separation and 
divorce  and  reconstitUted  households  have  become  everyday  eventi,  at  least· in  the 
northernmost part of the Union.  The very basis of the family has changed.  The family, In 
the past an institution and means of social integration, has become a pact between two 
Individuals looking for perianal fulfilment. 
.  _.~- - ..: .  - .  ·- -.  --·- ..::-- . 
2.  The  Instability of some  families,  combined  with economic problems,  may make  young 
people feel  rejected by society.  They become independent 'increasingly ·liti Jn·tife; their 
fixed  reference  points· are  becoming  blurr~ and  their ·parents  ·are  in increiiingly frail 
0 
economic  situatior\s.- 'Miny young  people  .. feel  excluded'·ino advance anif ·this is a majo;-
problem that the Union II  I  whole will have to tickle. ·  -
0 
3.  These changes in the role· of the family have gone together with the major events of our 
century: women's emancipation,  the massive entry of women into the labour market and·· 
control over fertility.  These have entailed radical and permanent changes in economic and 
social organisation and in the relationships between generations and between the sexes. 
4.  Despite  these  changes,  the  family  is the  main  network of individual  relationships  and 
solidarity.  It playa  an  important  part in  social  equilibrium.  In  a  period  of dwindling 
resources and doubts about State intervention in the family arena,  the time has come to 
think about an answer to the following question: what place  should the European Union 
give  to the  family  and  children  in the  light of the  key  issue  of social  ties  and  social 
cohesion 1  - ·  · 
62 CHAPTER  IV 
MIGRATION 
A complete demographic portrait of the Union has to include migration flows.  This is an important factor, 
11 it is increasingly slgnifteant 11 a component of population growth and is one the essential parameters 
in demographic projections.  We  need to find out, therefore,  what impact migration is having on the 
developments already discussed above such 11 ageing, the active population, family models, etc. 
4.  1  Analytlcai constraints · -
Some precisions are needed for a clearer unders~an~ng  of the  ·roie of migration In the Union'  I demography: 
they involve two chara<?ter1stics .~ifferentiating·mlgratoiV  groWth from natural g·rowth. In the fim  instince, -
there is a difference in dura.tiori- :Whereas birth and  death rates develop over the long term and with 
substantial continuity, at least when there are no major disturbances (wars, natural catastrophes), this is 
not true of migration whose intensity may vary subitantiaRy in very ·short periods· under the iinpetus of a · -: -
less abrupt short-term development.  The statistical data needed for a reliable evaluation of the levels and 
composition of migration flows are also difficult to find.  WhOa births, marriages, divorces and deaths-are 
scrupulously recorded in most modern States, changes of residence are not recorded in the same detail. 
Consequently, only countries with a population register are able to provide this information and we know, 
from experience,  that these are in some cases incomplete. 
• 1 •  Sources of data 
.  . 
In the European Union, five Member_ States do not have a -population register:  Fran~e. Greece,  Ireland, 
Portugal and the United KingdQm. ;1n the 4lbsenc• of dlrecntatislical-or·  administrative data, ~~~ lhin has · 
to be made of a range of  approximations of numbers-of'migrants for th.ese Member Stites, using populatic)n~ · 
censuses, labour force surVeys or other surveys carried out It  national level. ·An approach ofthis't'fpe then  _ 
raises the problem of the -comparability of information between Member States.  It is for this reason that 
analysis  of migration  trends,  which  is  difficult to carry  out and  necessarily  incomplete,- has  to· be 
supplemented by other indicators.  For this purpose, it is useful to observe the population by nationality, 
a variable for which there is reliable information and for which _it is possible to separate out demographic 
characteristics such as age or sex.  Observation of  this type is commonly known as •stock• measurement, 
in contrast to the evaluation of migration •flows• or streams. 
• 2 •  Stocks of migrants 
The confusion that is caused in some cases by the use of these two concepts needs to be avoided.  Rows 
relate to the volume and characteristics of people who, over a given period, leave or enter a  given territory. 
Stocks are the results of all these movements.· Stocks are  measured-at 1 given· moment - venically, it 
might be said- whereas flows are measured horizontally, over a specific period. 
Stocks of migrants are usually ascertained; for statistic'al ·and administrative purposes, by ·s~p.ratinca the·-' 
national population and 'the population-of foreign  nati~nality.-
Nationality, it is true, is an important indicator-in studying the economic and political impact oi migration. 
As it is based on a legal notion, nationality determines rights and privileges In a territory, from bo1h an 
economic point of view (right to work. to claim iocial benefits, to receive 1 pension, to have preferential· 
relationships with financial organisations) and a political point of view (right to vote, employment in the 
public service). 
63 Nationality is, however, a relatively poor indicator for underst.nding the social implications of migration. 
Many subjective factors far removed from the legal status repreaented by nationality determine the way 
in which a person is perceived by a community.  The other problem linked to the use of this variable to 
estimate migration Is that nationality is not exclusive and may vary during people's lives.  A non-national 
may acquire the nationality of the host country depending on the legislation in force in that country, just 
11 a national may return to the country.  In both these cases,  the migratory movement is not identiflld 
simply by nationality.  These principal limitations need  to be borne in mind when interpre.ting data on 
nationality. 
- 3 - Migration flows 
Statistics are ultimately of little help in understanding not only the direction - immigration or emigration • 
of migration  flow  a  and--their  ·intensity~  but. 1lso. their.· frequenc_y,_  an~ their demogr~phic and-social 
composition. This is a pity as tta.tistics•re a substantialsQUrce of information. when  me_asuri~g the ifl!pact. 
of migration on demographic development.  In order to refine demographic analysis, EUROSTA T needs to. 
be able to pursue the efforts to harmonise and supplement ~ta  collection that it has  undenak~n with 
Member States.  · 
When migration is not recorded in a population register it is possible to make use of_censuses  •. These latter 
provide indirect information on spatial mobility through questions about place  o~ birth, previous residence 
or residence at a particular date in the past.  These censuses uke place, however, only every ten years. 
Moreover, the question about place of previous residence, when asked, does not cover the same periods. 
The limitations imposed by the use of  ·these derived estimates are evident. 
Another data collection source is the United Kingdom's frontier survey evaluating international mobility. 
There are shortcomings, however, in its cover and accuracy.  -
Lastly, migrant identification criteria vary from one Member State to another.  They often differ depending 
on whether nationals or foreigners are involved.  In 1981, the United Nations proposed to define •tong-
term" immigrants as people entering national territory with the intention of residing there for at least one 
year, after having been absent from that territory for at least one year.  In practice, the only country to 
make use of this definition is the United Kingdom in its International Passenger Survey.  The identificition 
criteria of other countries are limited either to the migrant's intention to reside for a period of at least one 
year in the country, or quite simply, the  intention to reside  and  occupy housing, taking. no account of 
duration. 
This diversity of sources and identification criteria is not the only factor which makes it difficult to draw 
up comparable statistics on migration flows.  There are also major shortcomings in the reliability of the 
collection  process.  The level of cover of data  collection  varies  greatly from  one  country to  another, 
whatever the type of criteria used; and it Is not rare for the recording of emigration, for instance, to cover 
only one out of two emigrants and even, in certain cases, one out of ten.  It  is to be hoped that EUROSTA T 
and the United Nations will review international recommendations in this field. 
4.2  The foreign population In the European Union ·-
Before presenting the most recent data on the foreign population resident in the Union, it is pointed out 
that a distinction has be drawn between the situation of nationals of Member States of the  EU~ who are. 
entitled to move around and reside freely .within the Union under-the terms of the  ec·-rreatY~:and  ~-e:.- = 
situation of nationals from non-EU countries, who are not in principle so entitled. It  is useful to recall Article 
8 of the Treaty on European,Union which defines citizenship of the Union as follows: 
1.  Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.  Every person holding the nationality of a Member 
State shall be a citizen of the Union. 
2.  Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties 
imposed thereby. 
64 Article 8A states: 
1  .  Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territories 
of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditioni laid down in this Treaty and by 
the measures adopted to give it effect. 
2.  The Council may adopt provisions with a view to facilitating the exercise of the rights referred 
to in paragraph 1; save ai otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament. 
• 1 - Composition and development of the population by nationality 
'- . 
The most recent statistics show that on 1 January 1992 slighdy over 97~  of the population of the Union  · 
was made up of Union citizens.  Within this group, 4 million people, i.e.  1.5~. were living·'in:_a Member 
State other than the State whose nationality they possessed.  On this date, the foreign non-EU population 
was therefore 10 million people  (3~ of the totan.  · 
Graoh 27 
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-: -There-was  little change  in the distribution of the 
Union population by nationality until four years ago. 
From  1990,  the  number  of  non-EU  foreigners 
suddenly  Increased,  growing  by more  than  1  . 5 
million  people  in  two  years.  Slightly  earlier, 
- "tietween  1988  and  1990,  Union  citizens  had 
started  this  trend,  a  l~rger pr()portion  of Union 
citizens had decided, during this period, to reside in 
another Member State.  The Intensity of this recent 
increase  in the proportion of foreign population is 
obviously  reflected  by  an  increase  In  migration 
flows.  The  flows do not,  however,  explain  the 
whole  of this  increase;  duririg  this  period,  a 
proportion of the  foreigners  already, _but  illegally, 
residing  in  a  Member  State  regularised  their 
.  situation making use of a number of regularisation 
·Jaws. 
Grtob 28 
The  proportions of foreigners  in the Union are 
not comparable.  Member States to which, in 
the  past,  workers  have  immigrated  or people 
have returned from former_ colonies have higher 
percentages  of  foreign  non·EU  populations. 
These include Germany, France, the Netherlands -
and Belgium.  These countries alone account for_ 
7.5 million foreigners of non-EU origin, i.e. 77%:-
of the total of this category of foreigners ..  This . · 
means  that  these  foreigners  reside  in  much 
smaller  numbers  in  other  Member  States,. 
especially  in  the  Union's  Southern  Member· 
States. 
Trends In the national and non-national 
population In the EU • 1980 to 1992 
Source: EuiMr.t 
65 It is again Germany and France,  together with 
Benelux and in this case  the United Kingdom, 
which account for almost all  (90.6%)  foreign 
citizens of the Union. 
These two fandings show that while there may-· 
be positive migration flows to the other Member 
States,  these  are  mainly the  result of pfople 
returning to their own countries. 
Graoh 29-8 
Breakdown of the other EU citizens 
by Member State, on 1 January 1992 
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Breakdown of the nation.t population 
by Member State, on 1 January 1992 
Graoh 29-C 
Break~own of the non-EU citizens 
by Member State, on 1 January 1992 
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• 2 - Distribution .,d orlgtn of the foreign population 
The distribution of foreigners by original nationality has to be interpreted with care, as it does not 
take account of the foreigner's length of  residence in the host country. We know that naturalisation 
criteria vary from one Member State to another.  The fact that there were more Turks in the Union 
in 1992 than, for instance, Moroccan•, may be because fewer  Turks and their offspring have taken 
the nationality of their host country than Moroccans.  This does not necessarily mean, tl)erefore, 
that more immigrants have come in tt:t• p_ast from Turkey than from Morocco. 
The incre11e in the number of foreigners of a given nationality between 1985 and 1992 makes it 
possible to fill this gap to a certain extent.  During this period, Turks accounted for the greatest 
inCfl;aM in the European Union: more than half a million.  The number of Italian, Portuguese and 
Spanish foreigners decreased during this seven-year per!ocf, a very clear sign that these people are -
returning to their own countri8s, as.it is not very likelv..V\at they are ttmigrating out of the Union or. 
becoming naturalised.  The decrease In the number of Algerians, however, is more likely to be due 
to the acquisition of French nationality. 
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In the recent period between 1990 and 1992, Germany admitted eight times more foreigners, both 
Union  citizens  ( 160 000)  and  non-EU  foreigners  1800  000),  than  the  other Member  States. 
Nationals of Central and Eastern Europe accounted for 25% of this increase (over 200 000 people). 
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As mentioned above, only 1.4% of.Union citizens reside in a Member State other than the State 
whose nationality they possess. There is a very different picture for each Member State.  Over 12% 
of the Irish and 8% of the Portuguese reside elsewhere in the Union. The Irish, as is known, migrate 
in large numbers to the United Kingdom and large numbers of the Portuguese have emigrated in the 
post-war period, which, in proportion to the size of the population, generates a greater effect than 
in Italy, for instance. 
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So that these nationality data can be interpreted 
more  correctly,  a table  has  been  drawn up  of 
trends  in  the  numbers  of  acquisitions  of 
citizenship by foreigners by Member State and 
of levels of naturalisation  of all  foreigners  for 
the  fast  year  for which  this  information  was 
available.  Several  Member  States,  including 
Germany  and  Belgium,  the  Union's  main 
catchment  areas  for  foreigners,  have 
naturalisation  levels  which  are  rather  low in 
comparison  with  those  of  France  and  the 
Netherlands,  which  are  also  hosts  to  a 
substantial  non-EU  population.  :  Shaped  by 
different laws, these differences in acquisition 
of citizenship generate an underestimate of the 
extent  of migration flows for France  and  the 
Netherlands. 
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- 3 •  Demographic characteristics of the foreign population 
The  aim  was  to understand what part migration played  in  the  demographic development of the 
Union.  While it is true that the characteristics of the foreign population are an initial iodex, it needs 
to be  borne in  mind that an  essential  datum is missing: length of stay.  There  is then a_risk of 
producing an amalgam of very different contributions, bearing in mind that impact on demographic 
behaviour (fertility, family formation model, mortality) take& place ·over the long term and will be 
shaped by older immigrants, and impact on demographic structures (age,  sex, employment) takes 
place immediately and is generated by new immigrants.  If it is added that the_ composition of the 
population of foreign nationality may vary, even iJ ija·volume does not charige;.simply through  ' 
effect of migrations and naturalisations, the limitations of this analysis are ·eYident. 
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69 The breakdown of the resident population by main age-groups and nationality (nationals, EU citizens, 
non·EU citizens) is given for those Member States for which the information was available.  The age 
structure of non·EU residents is,  without exception, not as  old  as  that of nationals.  Non-EU 
residents have smaller proportions of  elderly people (aged over 65) and in general higher proportions. 
of young people (0·19) as  well.  Foreigners who are citizens of the Union also have a structure 
which ia not as old as  that ·of nationals, with the exception of the United Kingdom.  AmOng  EU · 
foreigners, however, young people account for a smaller proponion than among young nationals 
everywhere.  Fewer  elderly people  and  fewer young people necessarily  mean  more  people  of 
working  age.  In  the  20-64  age-group,  young  workers  aged  between  20 and  49  are  again 
proponionally more numerous among foreigners than among nationals. 
Why theae differences? They arelergely explained by migration, which is principally undertaken for 
reasons of employment.  Thla Ia particularly evident in the age profile of foreigners who are EU 
nationals.  In the non-EU population; the largest proportion of young people could bt due to the 
migration of migrant workers' families.  It is difficult, however, to  diuociat~ the effect of migration 
from the effect of the fertility of foreigners In this case.  In some Member States, the birth of a child 
to foreign parents makes it easier for this child to acquire the citizenship of that State.  Failure. to 
record the reason for migration again places limits on more detailed processing of this variable. 
- - - .  .. 
It should be noted that the brea~down  of foreigners by sex leads to the same divergence between-
nationals and foreigners.  In all Member States, the number of women is higher than the number of 
men  among  nationals.  _The  female/male  ratio  varies  in  Member States  from slightly over  1  00 
(Ireland) to 11 0 (Germany).  This variable is obviously linked to age structure: since it  is known that 
women have a higher life expectancy than men,  women are  necessarily over-represented in the 
elderly population.  The  ratios between sexes  are,  however, almost ilways in favour of men in 
foreign  popuiations,  In  panicular  among  non-EU  citizens.  The  youth  of  this  population  is 
supplemented in this case by a probable differential between the sexes from the point of view of 
migration. 
• 4 •  Foreign workers  _  . 
We concluded from the above that the foreign population included a substantial proponion of people 
of working age.  This observation is borne out by data that it has been possible to draw from the 
labour force surveys.  In Member States as a whole, there js a cenain consistency, over attn-year 
period, in the proponion of workers among foreigners.  There were almost 6 million foreign workers 
in  1992, distributed in a non-uniform way among  the Member States.  In comparison with the 
Union's current figure of 52%, the  proponion of workera among foreigners is lower in Belgium 
(38.5%), France (46%) and the Netherlands (44%) and higher in the other Member States with high 
levels of foreigners: Germany (60%), Luxembourg (65%). 
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It has been possible to break down these foreign workers by nationality for some Member Statu. 
The  table shows, in order of importance, the  four moat common nationalities.  The direction of 
certain migration flows are vary clear.  Turkish workirs and workers from the former Yugoslavia 
account  for  51% of the  foreign  labour force  in Germany.  They are  also  numerous (22%)  in 
Denmark.  Some other Member States also have a concentration of foreign non-EU workers where 
some groups are represented to a greater extent: Moroccans in S~in  (27%), Italy (14%) and the 
Netherland• (14%); Turka in the Netherlands (21 %). 
In other Member States the predominant proportions of foreign workers are  Union citizens:  the 
United Kingdom with 26% of Irish workers; Greece with 33% of British workers; luxembourg with 
2716  of both French and  Portuguese workers;  Portugal  with 6% of Spanish and  5%  of British 
workers.  In  these  two Member Statea,  no· more  than  6%  of non·EU  workers have  the  same 
nationality. 
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71 The sectors in which foreign workers work is also a factor of differentiation.  Whereas less than half 
of male  nationals  work in industry, a percentage  of close  on 60%  of foreign  workers work in 
industry.  Over-representation in industry can also be seen among foreign women. 
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We have looked up to now at the population of foreign nationality.  This has meant that we have 
disregarded information that is fundamental in evaluating the demographic impact of  migration: what 
are the yearly volumes of migration flows and what are their composition?  We shall now attempt 
to answer this question. 
- 1 •  Components of demographic growth 
Graph 35- Total and natural Increase of the EU 
population. from 1960 to 1992 
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The  differences  between  total  growth  and 
natural  growth represent  the  proponion  of a 
population  for  which  migration  growth 
accounts.  The continuing decline in the natural 
growth of the European Union began in  1965. 
For  close  on ten  years,  binhs have  exceeded 
deaths  in  the  Union  by only 500 000 to 600 
000.  Total growth is,  however,  more  erratic 
over this  period  as  a result  of the  effect of 
migration.  While  there  were  divergences  in 
migration  balances  in  the  period  1960-1 985, 
which were positive in some cases and negative 
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_ in others,. for the firlt time ln forty years there 
was  a  sustained  growth  in  the  migration 
proportion over a longer period.  Between 1985-
and 1990, the migration balance increased from 
278 000 to 954 000.  During the last two years 
of observation, .between  1990 and  1992, this 
balance was again higher (2 million in total). These  migration  b.tances  rtpreHnt  the 
difference between rht number of immigr.nta 
and emigrants.  An inerHH in these balances 
may therefort be due to two factors: a riae in 
the number of  ~n.tf  0!  a fall in the number. 
of  emigrants.  Thert  may . llao  hive bun 
improvements  In  diU colltetion  which  may 
have pinpointed praYioul dilplritin. In order to 
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migrants.  These data are not readily available. 
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It  Ia striking, when  looking at the emigration and 
Immigration trtnda  fOf\ho.H ~.supplying  _ 
thia information, that emigration.;. Y.II'Y· stable. 
with respect to lmmigrltion  •. :The aharp upturn- .· 
in numbers of immigrants between  1987 and 
1989 may be due to the return to the former 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  of  people  of 
German origin reaidtnt in the  former Getman 
Democratic  Republic  (the  •Oberaiedler•)  or 
elsewhere  In  the  countrill  of the  East  (the 
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• Auaaitdter•). 
Since 1990, Germany haa again attracted the largest number  .of immigrants, this time from Central 
Europe and the former Yugoslavia.  It  ahoutd be borne in mind  .. however, that theM data relate only 
to legallmmlgranu and that in 1990, a~  German reunification, movements between the Federal 
Republic and the Democratic Republic war• no longer deemed .to be international migration. 
In the United Kingdom, tt\e Member State with the aecond highest figur11 for migration flowa, 
emigration exceeded immigration in 1992.  Migration balances are also negative In Portugal and 
Ireland. 
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• 2 •  Characteriltict of migrants 
Apart from thefr nationality and country of last residence, little is known about the characteristics 
of migrants.  The direct dernc)Qraphic impact of Immigration on geographical distribution and age 
structure. for instance. cannot be measured. 
73 It is interesting to note that Union citizens, often nationals returning to their own countries, account for 
at least half of immigrant ftows in most Member States.  Immigration into the Netherlands is below this 
ftgure,  however, and immigration into Germany does not follow this pattern at all.  75% of immigrants 
to Germany in  1992 were non-EU citizens and 25% were non-EU citizens from Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Emigration which is, as mentioned above, small in extent except in Germany and the United 
Kingdom,  relates mostly to Union citizens and in many cases to nationals themselves.  In  Germany, 
however, emigration by citizens is proportionally distributed in the same way as immigration.  This shows 
that many people come and go between Germtiny and countries with which it has migration exchanges. 
Observation of  the countries from which migrants come and their nationality, highlights the important part 
that the  political events in  Eastern  Europe,  especially  the  Yugoslav  conflict,  have played  in  recent 
migration movements.  The former Yugoslavia and Poland are the two regions from which the majority 
of migrants seem to come and go: they have the nationatities of those countries, and leave in massive 
numbers, but also return in large numbers (migrants returning to the former Yugoslavia can only be of 
Croatian or Slovenian nationality, although this precise information is not shown in the statistics).  In 
1992, 300 000 immigrants were of German nationality and were Aussiedler coming for the most part 
from the countries of Eastern Europe.  Not all of them came to settle permanently in Germany: volumes 
of German emigrants are still sizeable (110 000 people}.  The USA is also a popular destination  for 
many emigrants. 
74 Graph 38 - Breakdown of immigrants and emigrants 
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In  1990, the number of people leaving one  Member State to settle in another was estimated at 
600 000.  This information has not been calculated for 1992 because no data are available.  The 
origin-destination grid that can be drawn up for 1992, albeit incomplete, bears out the powers of 
attraction that the central Member States, in particular Germany and the United Kingdom, exert on 
Union citizens. 
A proportion of non-EU immigrants are asylum seekers.  Estimating their numbers from applications 
would be  erroneous in this case  as  well.  Data  are not comparable among  Member States and 
several applications for asylum may come from a single applicant.  The growth in the number of 
applications is indicative, however, and Germany appears to be the most attractive country.  The 
United Kingdom records ten times fewer applications, but its powers of attraction have increased 
substantially since 1985.  Since the beginning of the  1990s, France  seems to have become less 
attractive to asylum seekers. 
The  origins of applicants for asylum differ in different Member States.  Applications received in 
Belgium come principally from Zaire and Rumania.  In Denmark, 65% of applicants are nationals of 
the former Yugoslavia. These asylum applications from Yugoslavs also account for the majority in 
Germany,  the Netherlands and  the United  Kingdom.  Spain  and  France  have  different profiles: 
applications come from Peruvians and Poles in Spain and from Turks and Zairians in France. 
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The history of migration is part and parcel of overall changes in world societies and economies.  A 
question can then bt  rais_~d about the demographic impact of migration: is  migration likely to modify 
the course of demographic development, in particular by affecting the ageing of structures, and is 
it possible to apprehend future trends in migration  1 
• 1 •  The role of migration In the ageing of the population 
The effects of the ageing of the populations of Northern countries should be felt to an even greater 
extent at-the beginning of the 21st century.  It Ia only then that an imbalance between the active 
and non-active population can be predicted in most European countries.  This type of reasoning is 
based, however, on the hypothesis that everything else wilt remain the.same ·a  forward-looking 
intellectual exercise that history has.often disproved.  In the meantime, the ratio of young to less 
young people In the active population will be In favour of the older group and the dyn.mic ·nature 
of the Western labour force could, looked at pessimistically, be 11ten away.  Some  people are 
worried about imbalances In social security systems and in particular in pension payment systems. 
These  fears  have led to the idea  that it is possible to offset demographic ageing  by importing 
foreigners.  Empirical observation disproves this idea: it is mistaken to believe that an immigration 
policy can remedy the growing imbalance in the age pyramid. 
Studies  at national level  have  unequivocally shown that it takes  less  than  one  generation  for 
Immigrants settling In a country to adopt Its demographic behaviour, in particular as regards fertility 
and mortality.  It Is not therefore possible to rely, in order to •rejuvenate• the population, on the 
long-term impact of immigration.  Massive immigration by a population with a very young structure 
is the only other way of plugging the •gaps• in our age pyramids.  Over and above the practical and 
ethical problema that massive immigration would entail· from the point of view of the reception of 
these populations, immigration largely by young children, i.e. the group that contains the deficits 
that are causing ageing, Ia unthinkable. 
• 2 •  Migration prospects 
Migration currents are  closely  linked to short-term  economic and  political events.  It is just as 
impossible to predict the former as it is to anticipate the latter.  Past trends are almost useless in 
predicting future immigration levels as the profiles of migration have undergone such major structural 
changes.  This is vital.  It makes it necessary to understand the important part played by better 
economic and political balances in controlling migration flows.  Consequently, the economic and 
political development of regions bordering on the Union, such as the Central and Eastern part of the 
European  continent and  the  countries bordering  on the  Mediterranean,  will  play  a key  role  in 
determining migration pressures·in the next century. 
• 3 •  Freedom of movement 
The challenge currently facing the Union is to create a genuine European area of free movement in 
which freedom of movement is not only a legal right but also becomes a daily reality for the people 
of Europe. This mobility would make it possible to attain the objectives of the Single Market, while 
establishing a more flexible and more efficient European employment market. 
77 In 1  period of high unemployment,  it is obviously more difficult to achieve this objective;  the ; 
remaining barriers need to be· removed, however, ao.that free movement can be promoted.  The-
EURES system w11 created with this aim. in view.  Some estimates predict, as the Single Market· 
Ia completed, an increiH in the miGration flows of frontier-zone managers and workers.  Some : 
Community programmes are promoting the mobility of some groups of peopre such 11 students, 
researchers and teachers. 
78 Chapter 4 
Key points for further consideration 
1  .  Migration is the least predictable of demographic events as its extent may vary substantially 
in very short periods in response to short-term developments.  This was the case between 
1990 and  1992 when the political upheavals of the  central  and  eastern  pan of Europe 
caused substantial migration to the Union.  From this point of view, the davelopment of the 
Mediterranean basin regions and the European countries in •conomic transition has to be 
seen 11 one of the key factors in potential migration pressurts on the Union.  .  .  .  .  .  - ·-:;. -·- ..... "-··· ...  --- '•· __  ...  ,_ .................  ·-~ ........  ····::-'  ·:  .. ·.··-::•-..; 
2.  International migration has little impact on the demographic model of the Member States. 
Migration cannot, in any case, counteract the ·affects· of population egeing.  At local level, 
however, a spatial concentration of new immigrants can generate particular stratifications. 
Unfortunately,  it is  not poasible  to appreciate  this issue  on  the basis  of the  statistics 
currently available.  ~-
3.  The  challenge  currently  facing  the ·union ·is  to create  a genuine  European  area  of free 
movement In which freedom of movement is not only a legal right but also becomes a daily 
reality for the people of Europe. This mobility would make it possible to attain the objectives 
of the  Single  Market,  while  establishing· a  more  flexible  and  more · efficient  European 
employment market. 
79 GLOSSARY 
Some definitions which may~  of ua• ·n underatanding the demographic concepts used in thia report are 
given below. 
DEMOG~PHICDEVROPMENT 
Changes in the size of a population over a given period, i.e. the incruse of this population, depend on its 
n•tur•l growth and its net ,;g,.rion. · N•ttH•I growth is the'  difference betW•en births and deaths; 
mlgr•tion measures the difference between numbers of· emigrants and lmmlgranta. 
The term •demographic transition• Is used by demographers to denote a transition from the uncontrolled 
mortality and fertility of traditionalaocieties to controlled systems where natality and mortality levels are 
much lower.  Practicany aU countries of the world have now entered this stage of demographic transition, 
but most countries are facing a much more rapid fall in mortality than in the European countries in the last 
century.  As their birth rate is also high, the timelag between falling mortality and falling fertility entails a 
period of very high demographic growth. 
How can we find out about 1 particular population in 5, 10, 15 or even 20 years' time?  Current population 
figures are projected to the date which is of interest on the basis of hypotheses about fertility, mortality 
and migration.  If a sub-population such as the active population needs to be studied, these need to be 
supplemented by hypothesu.on men's and women's future participation rates.  The longer the period, 1:'he 
more  questionable  these  hypothesu  become,  11 .they· then·  apply  to- a  papulation  which  is  itself 
hypothetical.  Moreover, the age-groups most affected by some events  (young people in the caae :of 
fertility; old people in the case of mortality; young adults in the case  of migration) may be subject .to 
varying degrees of error.  It is therefore preferable to use scemm'os which make it possible accurately to 
test the Impact of a particular hypothesii on the population as a whole. 
DEMOG~PHIC  AGEING 
Popu16tion •geing 
Demogr~phic  ageing entails 1 modification of the age structure of the population leading to an increi' 
the proportion of elderly people.  At the outset this is generated by a fall in fertility which proportic 
reduces the population of young people.  At present, however, the ageing of western populations il 
to a proportional Increase in the numbers of elderly people as a result of increasing longevity. 
Llfe expect•ncy 
Ufe expectancy measures the mean number of years for which a person of a given age can expect to 
When no age is specified, life expectancy is measured from birth, expressed 11 e..  Ufe expectancy 1 · 
(e,a),  for instance, indicates the mean number of years for which a person reaching the age of 65 
expect to live.  This value II  calculated from mortality tables which establish, from the deaths record« 
age for a year, the probability of death at each age. 
80 O.mogr.,ic deiHf'dMICY 
Demog~aphic dependency, 1110 known II the depM~dency  retio, ill  ratio betwttn IQt·groupsshowing 
tht proportions that same ag•groups rtprtHnt with respect to others.  This dependency attempts, in 
general, to evaluate the burden that the numbers of. young people and pensioners place on workers by 
relating the  ,papulation .ged under 15 anct over 85 to that aged betwun 15 and 85. 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION 
Tlftninology 
Birth rate, fertility and fecundity are often confused.  Thtae terms relate to different concepts: .Binh.rete · 
refers to the number of births that take place It  1 gwen time in the total population, while fenillty measur11 
the number of children born to women.  The former is 1  •snapshot• mtaaurement while the latter is a 
longitudinal measurement.  Nat having given birth to children is described 11 infertility.  Fecundity refers 
to a couple'  a biological ability to procreate. 
Birth rete 
Tht birth rate  Ia  obtained  by dividing tht number of births taking  place  during a year by the  mean 
population of 1 country far that year.  This measurement, although useful, doea nat genuinely reflect 1 
population'• procreative behaviour,  however, 11 It provides no information an the r:tumber of children 
actually born to women of procreative age.  From this point of view, the birth ratt doe  a not make It 
possible to ascertain tht direction in which the population will evolve in the long term. 
In order to evaluate the reproduction of a population using the number of births, use nuda to be midi of 
the total, also called the synthetic, fertility rate.  This measurement shows the number of children that 
women would have during their life if  the procreative bttt.viour, by age, of all women remained airnilar to 
ttt.t observed in a given year.  Although it can be readily measured, this rate is shaped by tht events of 
1 given year and may therefore be greatly influenced by ahort·term events. 
Completed ftnl1ity of  • genttetion 
Completed fertility is the only real indicator of fertility: it measures the mean number of children that 
women born in 1 given year have actually had during their lift. Unfortunately, it can be calculated only for 
tht older generations, when women are no longer fertile.  It  is for this reason that use is often made of the 
fertility rate, taking account of the limits on its interpretation  • 
. The generetlon tMitwel threshold: fertility of  2. t to prevent •  decline 
At what level does women'• fertility need to be to ensure the renewal of tht generations, when there is 
no immigration?  If  as  many boys as girls art born, and no woman dies before reaching the end of her-
reproductive life, the answer would tse obvious: an average of two children per woman which would allow . 
the fuQ reproduction of each couple.  For unexplained reasons, however, 1  05 boys are born on average for 
every 100  girla,·throughout the world.· To prevint  a pc)a)ulation reduction, 1  00 women must obviouaf.V _give 
birth to an average of 100 girls, which means a total of.205 children, I.e. 2.05 children per woman.  As 
there is atiH a low level of mortality among women of procreative age, however, the neceaurv ltvelia 2.1 
children per woman.  This means that if the short-term fertility index is below 2.1 for a long period, and 
there is not a positive migration balance, 1 demographic decrease Ia inevitable. 
81 ANNEX 
Age pyramids of the EU Member States at 1  .  1.  1993 
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